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Book Reviews
International Relations/Foreign Policy
The Global Village Myth: Distance, War, and the Limits of
Power
By Patrick Porter
Reviewed by Steven Metz, Director of Research at the US Army War College

T

he Global Village Myth is short, tightly-argued body blow to contemporary American security policy. In it Patrick Porter takes on an
important but often overlooked aspect of strategy—physical distance—
and critiques the popular notion that technology has diminished its
importance or even rendered it irrelevant. This is a seemingly simple idea
with big implications.
Porter believes underestimating the importance of physical distance
has an insidious effect on American strategy by stoking what he calls
“globalism.” This idea emphasizes the intricate connectivity of the world
today and concludes this gives the United States a stake in stability and
security everywhere. Americans fear “enemies from afar could force
a sleeping America into a fight,” and thus must be defeated while still
distant. (90) As President George W. Bush expressed it, “We will fight
them over there so we do not have to face them in the United States of
America.”1
Globalists, as Porter puts it, “perceive a transformed, dangerous
environment, a shrinking world where technology trumps terrain,
where the offense has advantages, where America’s security interests
are virtually limitless and on which American power can be imposed, if
only its leaders had the will. An imperial and restless ideology, globalism
is a potential force for belligerence as well as cosmopolitanism.” (216)
Although globalism in some way shaped American strategy for a
century, September 11 gave it a huge boost and temporarily quelled its
opponents. The American public and its elected leaders came to believe
their security “rested on the security of others” and this made even
remote dangers intolerable. Insecurity could—and would—spread, The
only logical response from this perspective was to embrace “the projection of power far beyond its hemisphere with no obvious limit, and
tame the world back into order.” (216-217) America, in other words, was
“both uniquely threatened and uniquely powerful.” (113)
Porter believes the globalist position vastly overstates the extent
to which conflict and threats around the world are connected, and
underestimates the extent to which physical distance still matters. He
demonstrates his position with three case studies: “netwar”—the idea
that technology and connectivity empower weak organizations like
al Qaeda against traditionally strong ones like the United States—
amphibious invasions operations using a hypothetical Chinese invasion
of Taiwan, and the combination of cyber warfare and drones.

1      President Bush Addresses the 89th Annual National Convention of the American Legion,
Reno, Nevada, August 28, 2007.
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Porter’s argument matters greatly to Army strategists and strategic
leaders. “Deterritorializing” the concept of security, he writes, “has led
to the neglect of limits, an insensitivity to strategic costs, a boundless
conception of interests, and the pursuit of absolute security at almost
any price.” (217) As a result, policymakers overestimate the ability of
the American military to impose its will on adversaries. The burden
of this chronic miscalculation falls heavily on the Army since committing it makes disengagement politically difficult. This difficulty can lead
policymakers to “double down” on failed operations or those whose
cost exceeds their benefits rather than writing off the effort. Think
Afghanistan today.
Porter also argues the further military force is projected, the more
elusive success becomes because advantage shifts to defenders. “In the
unending cycle of offense versus defense,” he argues, “the military-strategic balance for some time may favor weapon systems used skillfully for
defensive purposes against would-be expansionists.” (155) The observation that projecting military power long distances lowers the chances of
strategic success affects the Army directly, particularly in a time when
the qualitative advantage of the US military over potential opponents is
shrinking as technology disperses and the size of the American armed
forces shrinks.
Porter’s assessment leads him to advocate a more restrained security
strategy, particularly when considering the use of military force. The
United States should “proceed on the basis that it can place limits on
threats, curtail adversaries’ ability to operate, and wait patiently for them
to wither into an irrelevance or nuisance.” (224) Like other authors, such
as Andrew Bacevich and Christopher Preble, Porter believes, “we are
less powerful, but more secure than we think.” (224) That is a vitally
important idea: if his assessment is accurate and if American political
leaders accept it, the case for robust, expeditionary landpower weakens.
The logical shape for the US Army would be something like the preWorld War II model of a small, professional force capable of modest
expeditionary operations and of supporting partners; reserves would
be on call for major war or those entities posing a direct rather than an
indirect or theoretical threat to the United States.
This position is at odds with the thinking of the Army’s current
leaders. But Porter’s assessment deserves and demands serious consideration by them: unlike calls for dramatic cuts to the Army which are
motivated more by inter-service rivalry, his is based on a cold and penetrating assessment of the global security environment. The argument
may or may not be right, but it must be understood by the architects of
the future US military.
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Thinking Beyond Boundaries: Transnational Challenges to US
Foreign Policy
Edited by Hugh Liebert, John Griswold & Isaiah Wilson, III
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, US Army War
College Strategic Studies Institute

T

hinking beyond Boundaries: Transnational Challenges to US Foreign Policy
is an edited work produced by Hugh Liebert, John Griswold, and
Isaiah Wilson III—faculty linked to the Department of Social Sciences
at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. All three
of the editors are PhD-level scholars presently, or previously, teaching
in that Department, with two of them also serving as US Army officers. The work itself is primarily drawn from papers utilized at the 63rd
Student Conference on US Affairs (SCUSA) held in November 2011 and
subsequently modified based on participant feedback.
The original intent of these papers—eighteen of which are showcased in this book and written by twenty-six authors primarily affiliated
with the Academy—was meant to facilitate numerous small-group
discussions among West Point cadets and a few hundred select undergraduate delegates from civilian universities attending SCUSA. The
mission of these conferences is not only to bridge military and civilian
divides but to help bond cohorts of America’s future military, policy
making, and civilian leaders by looking at real world US foreign policy
issues and producing collaborative policy recommendations (based on
each table grouping theme). Along with these showcased papers, the
work also includes a contributor listing, foreword, acknowledgements,
introduction, conclusion, epilogue, and index.
The book is divided into three parts: tracing domestic issues in US
foreign policy; distinguishing regional dynamics in US foreign policy;
and turning global challenges into foreign-policy opportunities. Each
part of the book is then divided into six chapters, each with a theme and
specific title. These themes as they relate to transnational challenges—
which together may result in “compound security dilemmas” (220)—are
presented as follows. Part I includes institutions and US foreign policy,
US foreign policymaking, federalism and education policy, federalism
and immigration policy, thinking beyond civil-military boundaries,
America’s wars. Part II contains China, Middle East, South and Central
Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Part III is composed of cyberspace, foreign aid, proliferation, international political economy, the
environment, and strategic resources. Each chapter is typically laid out
with an introduction to the theme in question, a body of text addressing it along with related issues, and challenges it represents, and then
a number of questions for deliberation. Various combinations of recommended readings, additional readings, and recommended resources
(websites) are provided, always in addition to a notes section.
Quite a few exceptional chapters exist in the work. Chapter 18 by
Anne Pope, which concerns phosphate rock as a strategic resource
needed for fertilizer creation, is one example. Morocco, it turns out,
holds most of the world’s high-quality phosphate reserves. As worldwide reserves are depleted, its importance—along with that of other
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source nations of this component of food production such as Tunisia
and Algeria—will only continue to increase. In fact, these countries will
represent a concentrated area of production far more exclusive than that
which has ever been the case for oil production. (205)
Another chapter that should be highlighted is by Jeanne Godfroy
and Bryan Price; it focuses on civil wars as a form of persistent conflict
that has “national, regional, and global repercussions.” (66) In fact, per
former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in February 2011, across the
larger spectrum such conflict extends well beyond terrorism and insurgency. These and other chapter contributions are meant to challenge
readers by inviting them to be policymakers and subsequently to reflect
on policy by utilizing “a dialogue between theory and practice.” (220)
The work is an excellent resource for undergraduate American
foreign policy courses—especially those attempting to get some of
the SCUSA experience. An issue, of course, is the lack of freshness of
material that roughly originates from the later 2011 period. Since the
contributions in the work are unlikely to be updated and new challenges
will emerge, their foreign policy relevance will have a limited shelf life.
Additionally, while this is a superb book, it has somewhat marginal
utility at the graduate level and therefore is not well suited to war college
seminars. Still, this is a very useful work for facilitating undergraduate American foreign policy seminar interactions and, quite possibly,
another book may be produced from a future SCUSA event to replace
this work when it becomes outdated.
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Middle East
Psychological Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Conflict
By Ron Schleifer
Reviewed by Dr. Eado Hecht, independent analyst and Research Fellow at the
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies

T

he conduct of war is a collision of material and will between rival
communities. Most studies of war focus on the strategy and tactics:
force ratios, maneuvers, projection of fire power and logistics. However,
given that most wars, especially, but not exclusively, low intensity wars,
are decided long before one side runs out of material capability, many
would argue that the psychological aspects are in fact much more important than the material ones. Psychological Warfare is a specific effort to
influence the result of a war via the psychological aspects. It has three
separate but complementary branches: strengthening the resolve of one’s
own people to stay the course despite the pain inflicted on them; weakening the resolve of the enemy’s leaders, people and combatants; and
convincing outside spectators to support one’s own side in the conflict
whether by playing to their cultural preferences or to the benefit they
would accrue from this support or both.
Dr. Ron Shleifer is one of the few academics who studies
Psychological Warfare in general and is certainly the leading expert on
psychological warfare in the Arab-Israeli conflict. His previous books
and articles, describing and analyzing specific events or periods, have
successfully piqued the interest of professional readers. His purpose is
not merely to describe what happened but also to learn lessons and to
suggest principles on how to conduct psychological warfare in the future.
His previous books and articles each focused on a specific chapter of the
Israeli-Arab conflict – especially prominent were a very successful book
focused on psychological warfare in the 1987 – 1993 Intifada, an article
on psychological warfare during the fighting in Lebanon from 1985 to
2000 and another on the 2006 war in Lebanon.
As its title suggests, this book purports to cover the entire ArabIsraeli conflict. It provides abbreviated chapters from his previous books
and articles and adds new ones covering the period from approximately
1945 till 1982, the misnamed Second Intifada (2000 – 2006, branding of
the name itself being a psychological warfare success for the Palestinians),
Operation ‘Cast Lead’ (2008 – 2009) and the Mavi Marmara affair
(2010). Alongside the historical description of psychological warfare
methods employed by the rivals, Schleifer deduces lessons useful for
psychological warfare operators in other conflicts.
Rightly or wrongly, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been and continues
to be viewed internationally as a dominant global issue since 1948. This
interest in itself testifies to the importance of psychology in determining the actions of rivals and spectators in any war and emphasizes the
need of any community engaged in war to invest energy in winning the
psychological front. Over the past four decades, despite achieving its
political goals in most of its military confrontations, many of Israel’s

New York, New York.:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014
228 pages
$100.00
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purely military difficulties actually stem not from the material aspects
of conducting war but from the difficulty in ‘selling’ its policies and
military methods in Israel and abroad. Conversely, Israel’s rivals’ ability
to paint events in colors suitable to their goals and methods has been
gradually improving. Schleifer analyzes the methods applied by Israel
and the Arabs and attempts to explain why the Israelis are gradually
losing ground on this front.
Unfortunately, though the added historical information is important,
the book suffers from some serious authorial and editorial mistakes.
First and foremost is that the title is misleading – in fact the book really
covers the period from the 1980s till 2010 and focuses on only two
fronts of this conflict – the Palestinian and the Hizbullah. The entire
period from the mid-1940s to the mid-1980s is merely glossed over – 7
pages from 1948 till 1982. Even without changing the content, a more
appropriate title should have been chosen. Secondly, the content itself
varies in quality – the best chapters are those which were published previously on the first Intifada and on the fighting with Hizbullah. Finally,
there are many editorial errors. Two typical examples: leaving the captions to a number of photographs of leaflets without the photographs
themselves (pp 24 – 25), thus rendering some of the information in
the captions meaningless; the first paragraph of the Epilogue, begins
– “This book went into print after the Second Gaza War…” but then
discusses the Second Lebanon War instead. This paragraph is a literal
translation of the equivalent paragraph in a book published in Hebrew
in 2007 – except that there it was written Second Lebanon War...
To summarize, a useful book about an important topic, unfortunately marred by the quality of presentation.

The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century’s First Muslim
Power
By Soner Cagaptay
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, PhD, Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

Dulles, Virginia: Potomac
Books, 2014,
168 pages
$25.95

Soner Cagaptay’s study on Turkey delivers significantly more than the
title implies. While the author unquestionably addresses Turkey’s rising
global role and vastly strengthened economy, he also provides insightful
analysis of Turkish social and political transformation since the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) took power in 2002. This transformation centers on what the author describes as the end of Kemalism as the
Turkish guiding ideology. Kemalism is the vision of Turkey’s modern
founder, Kemal Ataturk, for his country’s social and political future. It
is best described as a European-oriented, top-down Westernization and
secularization approach, which also includes a special domestic role for
the military in protecting secular democracy. According to Cagaptay,
the AKP has now moved Turkey into a post-Kemalist phase as Ataturk’s
political vision is increasingly set aside, and the government establishes
a greater role for Islam in the public sphere. He describes some of the
new AKP policies as government-imposed social conservatism and
top-down social engineering. To illustrate this point, the author notes
government institutions now openly discriminate against secular Turks

Book Reviews: Middle East

121

in hiring and promotions, and this situation is particularly problematic
for women who choose not to wear the headscarf.
The architect of this vastly changed Turkey is Tayyip Erdogan,
who served as prime minister for 11 years and then became Turkey’s
first elected president in August 2014. Erdogan and his party have been
able win a series of consecutive national elections by drawing on the
strong support of voters from struggling low income neighborhoods,
where religion is often taken very seriously. Many residents of these
neighborhoods find Erdogan an appealing figure due to both his policy
positions and his childhood in Kasimpasa, a tough, low income, Istanbul
neighborhood. Unsurprisingly, many AKP supporters also resent their
country’s secular and Westernized elites epitomized by the Republican
People’s Party (CHP). Moreover, the increased strength of the economy
allows the AKP government to invest in education, health care, and
other social programs that benefit the poor, thereby consolidating the
loyalties of many low income voters. In this environment, Erdogan is
poised to remain the dominant figure in Turkish politics despite his
decision to change offices in response to internal AKP rules on term
limits for prime minister.
As prime minister, Erdogan, like Ataturk, used the force of his
personality to impose his worldview on Turkish society. He has also
governed in an increasingly authoritarian manner, and the AKP leadership has targeted some of its most assertive critics including media
figures and court officials for whatever punishment it can direct at them.
Steep fines have been leveled at the independent media on fairly flimsy
grounds, while Turkey has now surpassed China and Iran as the country
with the highest number of journalists in prison. The AKP government
has also eliminated the military’s role in Turkish politics through mass
arrests and intimidation of officers, often involving illegal surveillance
supposedly implemented to prevent a coup. The Turkish military has
been one of the most Westernized segments of Turkish society since
1826, and its leadership viewed the protection of Ataturk’s vision of
a secular Turkey as one of its most important duties from the 1920s
until the recent successful AKP’s moves to break the military’s political
power.
Against the AKP tide is an opposition that Cagaptay characterizes
as, “the other Turkey” (76). This group includes secularists who often
back the CHP, and comprise a significant segment (but not a majority)
of the electorate. In recent elections, the CHP has often done well with
middle class and upper middle class voters (especially women) and also
with Turks descended from families expelled from former Ottoman
Empire territories in Europe. The liberal, minority Islamic Alevis sect
was granted political freedoms by Ataturk, and overwhelmingly tends
to support secular parties such as the CHP. Despite these advantages,
the CHP has faced crippling difficulties due to its failure to modernize
and present a more inclusive vision for the country. Cagaptay states the
CHP needs to recognize and take advantage of the distinction between
government-sponsored social conservatism and non-political religious
devotion if it is ever to regain power. Cagaptay also includes many Kurds
(especially from the southeast) as part of the “other Turkey.” He suggests this group is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the leading
political parties since it has witnessed Iraqi (and to a lesser extent Syrian)

122

Parameters 45(2) Summer 2015

Kurds become more autonomous, albeit in response to internal disorder
in those countries. Accordingly, many within the Kurdish community
support the secular Democratic Regions Party (BDP), which is a Kurdish
nationalist party. Kurdish opposition to the AKP is not total however,
and the party has maintained a respectable showing among conservative
religious Kurds in recent elections.
Cagaptay asserts both secularists and Islamists need to find common
ground if Turkey is to avoid becoming hopelessly polarized and increasingly authoritarian. He is particularly concerned about differences over
possible plans to write a new constitution. The author further maintains
the 1982 Constitution, written by the military, “reads like a boarding
school’s ‘don’t do list’” (149), and many Turks would like to replace it.
Yet, an Islamist constitution would almost certainly be a disaster for
Turkey, producing massive anger among large segments of the population. Instead, Cagaptay calls for a constitution with a strong emphasis on
individual rights, allowing people to express Islamist or secular ideals as
they see fit. He contends a future Turkey embracing its Muslim identity
while maintaining its ties to the West could emerge as a powerful global
player, but this will not occur if the country is polarized by poisonous,
winner-take-all attitudes towards the country’s future.

The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’S Fight Against Terrorism
from al Qa’ida to ISIS
By Michael Morell
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, PhD, Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

New York, NY: Twelve,
2015
362 pages
$28.00

M

ichael Morell has written an important memoir of his 33 years in
the CIA with a special emphasis on events occurring after the 9/11
strike. He was in a number of key positions during this time frame and
had already assumed the plum job of CIA briefer to President George
W. Bush in December 2000. The remainder of his career (including later
positions as associate deputy director and the head of the CIA’s main
analytic arm, the directorate of intelligence) was often focused on the
struggle against terrorist organizations. Later, he rose to the rank of
Deputy Director and twice to Acting Director before retiring in 2013.
Unsurprisingly, Morell’s book conveys a pro-CIA viewpoint on such
controversial topics as the Iraq War, Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
(EITs), drone warfare, the bin Laden raid, the Benghazi controversy, the
Snowden affair, and a variety of other issues. A central focus of the
book is the CIA’s struggle against al-Qa’ida and its subordinate offshoot
organizations such as the powerful Yemen-based al-Qa’ida in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP).
Morell does not criticize President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq
and states that the president, “thought [the war] was necessary to protect
the American people.” (78) He also states the CIA provided the president with wrong information on the issue of Iraqi chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons, and this flawed intelligence helped Bush decide
to invade Iraq.
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Morell maintains the CIA’s conclusions on Iraqi issues immediately
prior to the war were one of the most important intelligence failures
in the history of the agency and even uses his book to issue a public
apology to former Secretary of State Colin Powell for misleading him.
Such statements seem like a huge admission of failure, but they are also
offered to rebut the even more serious criticism of being bullied into
endorsing politicized intelligence when placed under massive political
pressure to do so. Morell admits such pressure did exist on issues related
to Iraq and it was severe. According to Morell, Vice President Dick
Cheney’s staff was relentlessly pushing for hardline reports that could
be used to justify a war with Iraq. Morell further states the degree of
amateur intelligence analysis being conducted by political appointees
during this time frame was unprecedented in his career. He mentions
that Cheney’s Chief of Staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby literally yelled at
one CIA official over an intelligence document in which CIA analysts
refused to endorse his favored hardline conclusions. In Morell’s account,
the person experiencing Libby’s anger behaved like a hero and stated
he would resign before withdrawing the offending report. In a similar
incident, Morell recounts how another senior Cheney aide attempted
to impose a great deal of unreliable information on CIA experts in a
further attempt to improve the case for war. In response to this pressure,
Morell claims CIA analysts always acted with integrity and won every
battle over the contents of their reports. One hopes that is the whole
story, although it would seem wickedly difficult for these people to avoid
at least a certain level of self-censorship when faced with what former
Bush Press Secretary Scott McClellan called “our campaign to sell the
war.”1
In an especially controversial section of the book, Morell provides
a strong defense of the Bush Administration’s detention and intensified interrogation policies, the latter of which were designated with
the innocuous name Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs). He
had hoped that EITs would be allowed to continue under President
Obama, but the new president banned them on his second full day in
office. Additionally, although Morell likes and respects his former boss,
CIA Director Leon Panetta, he was unhappy when Panetta stated that
waterboarding was torture, a statement Morell saw as confrontational
with the CIA old guard. Morell insists individuals subjected to EITs
provided significantly better information than in situations where they
were interrogated with more conventional techniques. He also states
EITs helped alert the CIA to the importance of courier Abu Ahmed as
a lead to find Osama bin Laden. Morell maintains any intelligence on bin
Laden was important since he was so difficult to find. Moreover, even
with intelligence gathered through a variety of means, Morell believed
the case was “thin” for bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad on the eve
of the May 2, 2011 raid. While the CIA leadership was delighted with the
outcome of the Abbottabad raid, Morell indicates the president chose to
authorize it on the basis of very limited intelligence.
In one of the most compelling discussions in the book, Morell provides a strong defense of drone warfare, and calls these systems, “the
single most effective tool in the last five years for protecting the United
1     Peter Baker, Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House, New York: Doubleday,
2013, 224.
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States from terrorists.” (137) He makes a strong case that drones are
among the most precise weapons in the history of warfare and that collateral damage from their use is often “highly exaggerated.” (138) Morell
effectively notes the success of drones in Yemen and Pakistan, but he
does a much weaker job of discussing the reemergence of AQAP in
Yemen during the mid-2000s, stating this comeback occurred primarily
because of a 2006 jailbreak by AQAP prisoners in that country. This
jailbreak, while brazen and clever, involved only a limited number of
individuals, all but six of whom were killed or recaptured over the following year. Another factor of potentially greater importance to AQAP’s
success involved the flight of significant numbers of terrorists from Saudi
Arabia to Yemen bringing their connections to terrorist financing with
them. Likewise, around this time, a number of battle-hardened Yemeni
jihadists were returning from the fighting in Iraq and were interested in
waging war against the government of their own country.2
Morell also discusses the controversy over the 2012 deaths of four
US government officials in Benghazi, Libya. He is especially offended
by charges that the CIA collaborated with the White House to cover up
key facts about the attack, and he understandably does not enjoy being
called a liar over his actions related to this incident. Morell puts forward
what he views as the relevant evidence on events in Benghazi, but fears
the entire episode has entered into a discussion where facts do not
matter. He emphatically denies charges he doctored documents relating
to the attack and methodically refutes a number of reckless statements
about a White House/CIA conspiracy. In a separate discussion, he also
looks closely at the Edward Snowden affair and maintains that Snowden
released information that helped enable the rise of the Islamic State. He
unequivocally calls him a traitor.
In sum, this is a book of strong opinions by a CIA loyalist and
committed organization man. The author puts forward his perspective
because he believes many CIA actions have been unfairly criticized by
irresponsible elements within the media and by political leaders who
have attacked his agency as a way of getting at their political opponents.
Morell is critical of these individuals in polite and respectful language,
but he gets his message across. All this is not to say Morell does not have
an important point of view, or that he fails to provide a well-reasoned
defense of many controversial CIA activities, but this book is clearly
designed to persuade as well as enlighten the reader.

2     I have examined this issue in a monograph written for the US Army Strategic Studies Institute.
See W. Andrew Terrill, The Conflict in Yemen and US National Security, Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies
Institute, 2011, 54-57.
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Ethics
In Defence of War
By Nigel Biggar
Reviewed by Dr. David L. Perry, Professor of Applied Ethics and Director of the
Vann Center for Ethics, Davidson College, and former Professor of Ethics, US
Army War College

T

he author, Dr. Nigel Biggar, is Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral
Theology and Director of the McDonald Centre for Theology,
Ethics and Public Life at the University of Oxford. He has published
several books and dozens of scholarly articles on Christian ethics, serves
on the Editorial Advisory Board of the Journal of Military Ethics, and has
lectured at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.
I became acquainted with Professor Biggar over thirty years ago
when we both studied ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity
School. I do not share all of his Christian convictions, but I have always
been highly impressed by the quality of his scholarship and analytical
skills. In Defence of War is a tremendously impressive book, which I am
happy to recommend strongly.
In chapter one, Biggar persuasively shows three influential Christian
ethicists—Stanley Hauerwas, John Howard Yoder, and Richard Hays—
failed to prove the New Testament to have consistently promoted strict
pacifism. Chapters two and three explore whether soldiers can plausibly
exhibit Christian love of enemies and right intention in combat situations. Drawing extensively on the reflections of combat veterans, Biggar
demonstrates soldiers frequently do exhibit love toward their fellow
troops and the innocents they protect, as well as respect for at least
some enemies. (78-91) But he does not convincingly prove killing or
maiming enemies can plausibly reflect love for them, leaving me unsure
how soldiers, while employing deadly force, could possibly uphold Jesus’
command to love their enemies.
Then again, Biggar also insists warriors do not intend to kill or wound
enemy combatants at all, “insofar as ‘intend’ means to ‘choose and want as a
goal’ rather than to ‘choose and accept with reluctance,’” i.e., as a necessary and proportionate side effect “of intending something good—say,
the protection of the innocent.” He recognizes that his view “tests the
patience of those who have first-hand experience of war-fighting,” but
insists nonetheless that it is “more Christian” than its alternative, “better
calculated to restrain violence,” and “sufficiently realistic about military
psychology” (103, 110). However, I frankly believe his ethical standard
here is set so high almost no Christian (or anyone else) could satisfy it,
and moreover, it would be unfair to expect soldiers to uphold it or blame
them for failing to do so.
Chapter four by itself is well worth the price of the book. There the
author examines the just-war principle of proportionality in both its jus
ad bellum and jus in bello modes, focusing on whether Britain’s decision to
go to war against Germany in 1914 and General Douglas Haig’s attack
at the Somme in July 1916 were proportionate in those respective senses.

New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2015
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His answers in both cases are yes, but readers owe it to themselves to
see how he arrives at them. Consistent with the teachings of Christian
theologian Thomas Aquinas, et al., Biggar notes “a war that lacks just
cause or right intention cannot be proportionate, since none of the evils
that it causes can be justified.” (147) But one of his most startling claims
in defense of Haig and others is that “a certain kind of callousness is a
military virtue, and the fact that a commander’s chosen plan involves
the foreseeable annihilation of whole bodies of his troops need not be
culpably disproportionate.” (148)
Chapter five is devoted primarily to addressing several criticisms of
just-war theory made by the philosopher David Rodin in his influential
book, War and Self-Defense. While agreeing with some of Rodin’s concerns
about international law, Biggar systematically refutes Rodin’s arguments
against just-war principles. Along the way, Biggar offers many nuanced
insights on the historical development of that tradition, especially from
Augustine to Grotius.
Controversies regarding humanitarian military interventions, specifically NATO’s 1999 war against Serbia to stop its ethnic cleansing of
Kosovo, are addressed in Biggar’s sixth chapter. NATO’s intervention
has been criticized as violating the UN Charter, since Serbia did not
pose a direct threat to neighboring countries and the Security Council
did not authorize an intervention as permanent members Russia and
China would surely have vetoed any such resolution. Biggar counters
that NATO’s actions may not have violated the UN Charter, though
that interpretation seems weakly supported; he thinks it unlikely those
drafting the Charter would have ruled out humanitarian interventions
absent Security Council approval, given Nazi atrocities were so fresh in
their minds. (221-222) But he forgets (here at least) Hitler had claimed
humanitarian motives in annexing the Sudetenland and invading Poland,
examples which must also have worried those writing the Charter. Biggar
is on more solid ground in citing humanitarian precedents in customary
international law and in stating compelling moral reasons for protecting
basic human rights even if international law is infringed or ignored.
In chapter seven, the author opens with concise and lucid summaries of the standard just-war criteria, and then spends seventy pages
carefully applying each one to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He reaches
the rather unorthodox conclusion that it was justified overall. I would
only fault him in failing to consider pre-war US claims that Saddam
Hussein was producing biological weapons in mobile labs and had tried
to import aluminum tubes to use as centrifuges in his nuclear weapons
program. Both claims were later shown to be ridiculously false and in my
view, the Bush Administration deserves grave moral blame for making
them, given that they were vital in persuading the American people and
Congress to support the invasion.
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Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter
By Sibylle Scheipers
Reviewed by Dr. David L. Perry, Professor of Applied Ethics and Director of the
Vann Center for Ethics, Davidson College, and former Professor of Ethics, US
Army War College

D

r. Sibylle Scheipers is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations
at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland and was previously
Director of Studies for the Changing Character of War Programme at
Oxford University. She earned a PhD at Humboldt University in Berlin
and was a post-doctoral fellow at Chatham House. This is her second
solo-authored book in addition to editing three others including Prisoners
in War (Oxford, 2010) and several articles published in scholarly journals.
Early in Unlawful Combatants the author reminds us, “Under the
law of armed conflict, irregular fighters such as insurgents, guerrillas,
and rebels are largely excluded from the privileges and protections of
prisoner-of-war (POW) status.” Her primary intent in this book is to
explore “the ambiguity of the status of irregular fighters, the political opportunism entangled with categorizing someone as an irregular
fighter, and…the stark consequences of such a categorization.” (2)
To a great extent Scheipers admirably succeeds in illuminating those
topics through a detailed study of several specific periods in military
history and related developments including international law (primarily
Europe and North America from 1740 to 1815), the American Civil
War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Second World War, colonial wars in
Haiti, Malaya and several parts of Africa, and recent struggles against
Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraqi insurgents. I am impressed with the
myriad examples of irregular fighters Scheipers identifies through her
wide-ranging research, the careful distinctions she makes among them,
and the frequently problematic interpretations of those combatants she
teases out of the writings of generals, politicians, and lawyers.
An intriguing theme running throughout Unlawful Combatants is
irregular warfare often occurs at the edges of conventional war, and
even as an authorized auxiliary to it, e.g. in the American Civil War and
Franco-Prussian War (ch. 3). Scheipers also conveys how difficult it can
be to establish stable and robust legal rules regarding irregular warfare,
given that it includes widely disparate forms ranging from organized
insurgent groups, semi-official partisans, and widespread popular uprisings against occupying uniformed troops.
One drawback of Scheipers’ approach is that by focusing on
opportunistic uses of the term “irregular” and its synonyms from state
apologists, she ignores ways in which typical irregular war tactics—
stealth, surprise, raiding, looting, rape, indiscriminate killing etc.—were
standard procedures (i.e. “regular”) throughout much of human history.
For example, while discussing North American conflicts in the late eighteenth century (ch. 1), she claims:
What Europeans encountered as “Indian warfare”—that is, the conduct of
Native Americans on the battlefield—was an adaptation to the new weapons
technologies that Europeans had brought to America. Native American
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warfare before the arrival of the gun had been mostly limited, ritualized,
and rather low in mortality. (39)

But such claims are overly sweeping and misleading, as Lawrence
Keeley demonstrated in his fascinating book, War before Civilization: The
Myth of the Peaceful Savage (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
While Native Americans surely did adapt some of their tactics after
being introduced to European weapons, Keeley proved that mortality
rates in violent conflicts between Native American cultures prior to
contact with Europeans were usually much higher than mortality rates
from wars waged between modern industrialized countries. Moreover,
human beings most likely inherited violently aggressive tendencies and
even some war tactics from the common ancestor species that also
produced chimpanzees, according to Richard Wrangham and Dale
Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 1996). To be sure, Scheipers could not possibly write
about every case of irregular warfare in human history, but it would be
interesting to know whether her approach in Unlawful Combatants would
have been modified by exposure to these works.
On America’s “War on Terror,” Scheipers is right to criticize the Bush
Administration for denying, post-9/11, that the Geneva Conventions
applied to Al Qaeda detainees. (195) She also perceptively points out
the United States has supported some Afghan and Iraqi irregular fighters without clearly articulating how they differ legally or ethically from
enemy irregulars. (217-221) But I am not persuaded by her claim the
concept of “unlawful combatant” in itself “suffers from internal inconsistencies,” (190, 222) since that term can simply refer today to a fighter
who does not satisfy all of the Geneva Convention criteria required to
be accorded full POW status.
Overall, I recommend Unlawful Combatants enthusiastically as a
detailed and thoughtful history of irregular warfare.

Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy
Edited by Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg
Reviewed by Ulrike Esther Franke, Doctoral candidate at the University of
Oxford, supervised by Prof. Sir Hew Strachan

S
Cambridge, England, UK:
Cambridge University
Press, 2014
512 pages
$34.99

o many books on drones and “drone warfare” have been published
in the last few years that a new drone book needs a good answer to
the question “is there something new in it?”. Drones have become the
hot topic in international relations and security studies, not least because
of the substantial public interest in the matter. This has led to a plethora
of news reports, newspaper articles, academic papers, and increasingly
books, to be published in the last few years. Not all of them deserve to
be read or reviewed.
Drone Wars, Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy, edited by New
America’s Vice President Peter L. Bergen and New America Fellow
and Professor at Arizona State University Daniel Rothenberg certainly
deserves both. In 22 essays over 512 pages, the authors – most with a
background in academia, law, journalism, or politics – offer fascinating
insights into different aspects of the US drone programme.
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The essays are ordered into four somewhat lose sections; ‘Drones
on the Ground’, ‘Drones and the Laws of War’, ‘Drones and Policy’,
‘Drones and the Future of War’. Each section begins with fascinating first-hand accounts. A journalist who was held captive for several
months in Waziristan reports on having lived under constant drone surveillance. A US drone pilot, in a particularly fascinating essay, shares his
experiences of fighting “war at a very intimate level”. A Special Forces
commander describes his use of UAVs in Afghanistan and gives rare
insights into the Afghan populations’ view of drones. A Pakistani from
North Waziristan shares his fear of – but also his gratefulness for – the
US drone programme, giving the reader a glimpse of the complex situation on the ground.
Depending on their previous knowledge of the topic, readers are
likely to enjoy different essays. No review can do justice to an edited
volume, particularly not one containing that many essays. While all
the chapters are good, some offer more unique and novel insights than
others. I particularly enjoyed four essays.
In “What Do Pakistanis Really Think About Drones?”, Saba Imtiaz
gives an excellent overview of the US drone operations in Pakistan. This
is a brilliant paper even for those familiar with the topic. Particularly,
it puts the US-Pakistan drone campaign in a broader context of
US-Pakistani relations, an aspect usually lacking in the discussion. Imtiaz
shows how the (US-backed) Pakistani policy of allowing the strikes in
secret, while publically condemning them, has created major backlashes
in Pakistani-US relations and has negatively influenced Pakistani citizens’ view of both the US and Pakistani domestic politics. “The use of
drones in Pakistan has become the face of US foreign policy in the
country” (90), Imtiaz argues. Ultimately however, “drones are not the
core problem in US-Pakistan relations, but rather a symbol [...] of what
is wrong with American interventionism in general” (100).
Naureen Shah offers fascinating insights into Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC) and its drone operations in “A Move
Within the Shadows“. With most of the public and political attention being
focused on the better-known CIA ops, JSOC’s role is often neglected,
its extensive involvement in US drone operations notwithstanding. Shah
analyses JSOC’s development, arguing that the organisation’s novelty
and the political support it enjoys means that it “remains unencumbered
by many of the oversight processes and reporting requirements that
developed, over time and in response to scandals and public pressure,
for the CIA and conventional military forces” (175). Accordingly, it is
questionable whether handing over the drone programme from the CIA
to the military – and JSCO – would indeed signify an improvement in
oversight as many have argued.
In the expertly researched chapter “Predator Effect”, Megan Braun
discusses the development of the iconic Predator drone. She asks how
revolutionary drones have really been and argues that they were transformative only in the context of the ‘War on Terror’, as they were “so
ideally suited to the post 9/11 vision of the CIA” (277). Braun believes
that “the current Predator program is unlikely to be replicated in the
near future” (255).
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Werner J.A. Dahm, previously Chief Scientist of the US Air Force
takes on the claim that increased automatisation will be the next logical
step in the development of drones. Dahm explains the ‘F2T2EA’ kill
chain (‘find, fix, track, target, engage, assess’), and argues that one of
the public’s biggest concerns, namely, “removing humans from the
engage part of the F2T2EA process”, provides “essentially no strategic
gain” (351). His paper will not settle the debate on automatisation and
autonomy, but it represents an informed contribution to a debate rigged
with speculation.
Overall, Drone Wars offers many new insights and approaches that
are much needed in the drone debate. The book’s essay structure makes
it particularly suited for teaching, also because there is quite some disagreement between the authors on several questions, such as whether
drones are revolutionary, whether the US strikes are legal, or what the
future of drone operations will look like.
The book’s main flaw is its US-centric approach. Based on the
premise that drones “have become a lens through which US foreign
policy is understood” (1), the authors make it seem as if US foreign
policy is the only lens through which drones can be understood. Other
countries’ uses of drones are largely ignored, only drone proliferation
is discussed. This means that the authors run the risk of seeing drones
uniquely in the context of the ‘War on Terror’. Counterbalancing this
US-centric view would have made the analysis stronger.
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Stability Operations
Mission Revolution: The US Military and Stability Operations
By Jennifer Morrison Taw
Reviewed by Dr. James H. Embrey, Professor of Stability Operations, US Army
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College

A

recurring debate within US military affairs is whether change within
military operations is “revolutionary” because they are a profound,
distinct departure from the past, or they are “evolutionary” as the next
logical steps in adapting to complex, recurring and somewhat intractable
problems. In “Mission Revolution,” Professor Jennifer Taw asserts over
the past two decades Defense Department civilian and military leaders
have made a revolutionary shift in accepting and integrating “stability
operations” as a core mission for US military forces. Faced with wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan and “persistent conflict” in coming years, issuance of DoD Directive 3000.05 was the pivotal point where progressive
defense leaders mandated reform and improvements of doctrine, organization and training whereby “stability operations” – the capability to
establish order advancing US interests and values – were put on equal
footing with offense and defense capabilities. In doing so, progressives
began purposefully moving military forces from a warfighting focus on
delivering “decisive force” into areas traditionally civilian-dominated
efforts due to the rise of complex threats of international criminals, terrorist, and jihadists. Taw offers alternative reasons beyond the past two
decades of peacekeeping and counterinsurgency experience as to why
such “infamously stubborn institutions” such as the US military would
adopt such changes, asserting they are mostly pragmatic and self-interested: that Pentagon leaders now embrace new, non-standard missions
reinforcing the utility of military efforts in policy accomplishment in
order to retain force structure during future austerity.
Taw provides an interesting overview of the historical context and
doctrinal development for stability operations throughout US history,
noting land forces have been constantly involved in a variety of lesser
contingencies and post-war commitments exceeding the capacity
and acceptable risk of civilian USG efforts. However, “warfighting”
preparation has dominated readiness efforts while assuming the risk
that a military prepared for conventional conflict could readily adapt
to lesser contingencies where security and stability were the focus of
USG efforts. These perspectives ran counter to the needs of post-Cold
War Administrations who complained the Pentagon’s “all or nothing”
to using military force created an expensive military with little utility
in shaping and maintaining international order. Much to Secretary
Rumsfeld’s frustration (who also believed the military shouldn’t “do
windows”), Iraq and Afghanistan post-conflict requirements again
highlighted military force in itself is rarely decisive, and significant skilled
and capable military forces are required in insecure environments to
accomplish sustainable political outcomes.
After this insightful analysis, Taw’s explanation of why change
occurred is more problematic as she echoes popular criticisms of
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“militarizing of foreign policy.” She proposes this “mission revolution”
results from both “securitized instability” — with each Administration’s
obsession with rising global violence as the preeminent threat to US
global interests — providing “institutional privileging” for preserving
DoD and military capabilities necessary to counter threats to world order
by pernicious jihadists, terrorists, narco-criminal activities. She proposes
DoD dominance diverts resources, atrophies other agencies capabilities
and we akens long-term efforts to build resilient societies that reject
violent radicalism, but she does not sufficiently explain Defense’s sister
“3 D’s”— Diplomacy and Development — have not instituted their own
“mission revolutions” in adapting to the challenges of an unsecure, volatile world. In all, the past decade of war has shown the opposite; DoD
and military leaders are willing to divert significant funding, manning
and training resources and support increased Congressional funding
for civilian deployment, planning and coordination capabilities to work
alongside security assistance efforts in vital, higher risk environments.
In considering military efforts from Vietnam through the Balkans
to the present, many of the changes identified are less a revolution than
mission-required evolution. The requirements of DoDD 3000.05 were
generate capabilities to “support” and not supplant under-resourced
civilian efforts operating in conflict environments – an enduring, traditional military mission. Additionally, requiring the military to devote
equal emphasis to generating capabilities to “establish order” and
“develop indigenous capacity” in violence prone areas is a necessary
institutional reminder to military and Congressional leaders — capable
and flexible forces are constantly needed by US leaders to accomplish
strategic success beyond fighting and winning wars, including efforts
to build partner capacity. Finally, in a world of fragile states, increasingly threatened by non-state actors, efforts appearing to be militarizing
foreign policy are pragmatically the “best, worst option” given the
dearth of civilian capacity to work in high-threat environments as well
as countering challenges to host nation legitimacy and stability which
are the foundation for long term development success.
Nevertheless, Mission Revolution is a valuable analysis of the last
decade’s efforts to balance military capabilities while concurrently
enabling US success across a broader range of political and military
needs. It highlights the challenges of integrating the organizational cultures across the defense, diplomatic, and developmental communities
to improve interagency coordination. Her informative insights provide
guideposts for future decision making on how far we should move
toward security-dominated solutions abroad. As a colleague recently
noted, US leaders are seeking a way out of resource intensive counterinsurgency and stability operations while adversaries work their way into
them. Given traditional institutional preferences across all of the 3Ds,
it will be interesting as the decade of war fades into the past to see
how permanent DoD’s changes will be, and whether a “revolution” will
occur within civilian agencies to enable better coordination and planning with military security assistance and capacity building. As in any
true revolution, we will only know when the uncertain future becomes
the discernible past.
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Violence After War: Explaining Instability in Post-Conflict
States
By Michael J. Boyle
Reviewed by James H. Lebovic, George Washington University

M

ichael J. Boyle’s new book offers a welcome look at post-conflict
violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor,
and Iraq. Despite its title, the book sensitizes readers more generally to
the fallacy of assuming that countries have graduated to post-conflict
status with the ostensible end in fighting. Conflict can persist when parties
seek to “renegotiate” the terms of a peace through violence, new parties
arise to stake their claim to power, or coalitions dissolve in disputes over
the division of the spoils.
The book focuses accordingly on “strategic violence” which is
“designed to transform the balance of power and resources in a state”
(8). Such violence is most obvious when one or more of the contending
parties seeks to challenge the terms of a settlement having agreed to
them, perhaps, under duress or false pretenses. But strategic violence
sometimes has a more complex explanation with ambiguous evidentiary support. It can occur when groups fragment to pursue their own
(unclear) agendas by capitalizing on ethnic, religious, or political conflict and engaging in criminal activities by employing criminal gangs to
mobilize resources and target opponents for “strategic” purposes. “Not
only can such violence be unconnected or only indirectly related to the
cause of the war itself, but it can also provide a space for opportunists to
pursue a variety of personal or criminal vendettas, some of which will
be detached from the fighting that preceded it.” In consequence, “the
violence of the post-conflict period will often appear as an inchoate mix
of personal attacks, criminal violence, and political-strategic violence
significantly different from violence in the war that preceded it” (5). In
Boyle’s terminology, strategic violence mixes with “expressive violence,”
an emotional response to loss or suffering, and “instrumental violence,”
undertaken for criminal or personal gain. The analytical challenge is
met, as Boyle recognizes, by ascertaining the collective (not individual)
motives behind the violence, as discerned from tell-tale, aggregate
patterns. For that effort, Boyle marshals revealing quantitative and
qualitative evidence to portray trends over time in the various conflicts.
According to Boyle, the key to understanding the role of strategic violence in post-conflict countries is appreciating the distinction
between the “direct pathway” to violence in which the parties, targets,
and issues in contestation remain relatively constant (from the conflict
through the post-conflict periods) and the “indirect pathway” in which
groups splinter and violence is a function of “multiple and overlapping
bargaining games between new and emergent claimants for power and
resources” (12). In discussing these pathways, Boyle’s central argument
reduces to four hypotheses that derive from a “2-by-2” table, structured
around two binary variables. These variables are: a) whether the original parties have accepted a settlement and b) how much control these
parties exercise over their membership. Simply put, strategic violence
emerges through the direct pathway when a party refuses to accept a
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settlement and through the indirect pathway when the level of control is
low. Consequently, strategic violence can occur simultaneously through
the direct and indirect pathway when a party refuses a settlement and
when the level of control is low.
In positing these hypotheses and testing them against the case evidence, Boyle moves beyond the largely descriptive focus of the early
theoretical chapters to explain the occurrence of strategic violence. In its
illuminating detail, the case-study analysis provides support for Boyle’s
provocative arguments. Yet it also serves to highlight the book’s limitations, which are as follows:
First, the utility of Boyle’s approach rests on the viability of a 2-by-2
table that assumes implicitly that the loss of control and nonacceptance
of a settlement by any side produces the same outcome. But do the
effects of a loss of control depend, instead, on whether a group has
accepted the status quo? If so, additional cells are required in the table.
The splintering of the Mahdi Army under the leadership of Moqtada
al-Sadr in Iraq, for example, testifies to the challenges for group leaders
who pursue “moderate” goals – in this case, tacitly accepting a US troop
presence through a declared cease fire – that alienates extremist elements. Would the same result occur, however, if “rejectionist” goals were
widely shared within a group? Under these conditions, factions might
engage in one-upmanship – challenging one another through competitive violence – yet operate nonetheless in broad alignment to achieve
common goals. That question alludes, then, to an underlying problem
in Boyle’s analysis. Despite his ostensible focus on motivation, Boyle
simply assumes that a loss of control by a group over its members results
(through the indirect pathway) in strategic violence. That assumption
requires justification. After all, these subgroups might choose instead to
defer to the existing group leadership out of fear of isolation or loyalty
to a political agenda; they might try to work themselves into positions of
influence to wrest power from within; they might challenge the control
of leaders only when the leadership or goals of the subgroup changes;
or they might channel their discontent into lucrative criminal activities.
Second, the variables in Boyle’s analysis are defined so generally
and inclusively that the underlying logic is arguably circular. Boyle
depicts the level of internal control as the capability to achieve compliance by inflicting costs (punishment) and distributing benefits (political
positions, jobs, and profits). The analysis does not focus on any one
tool or any set of mechanisms. Instead, it identifies a loss of control
in the case evidence when “new” groups engage in strategic violence,
and then backtracks to the reasons. A similar problem results when
Boyle discusses the opportunity structure – the “cluster of features in
the external environment” (90) – that facilitates or suppresses strategic
violence in a country. These features include geographical barriers, the
visibility and proximate presence of a target community, the flexibility
of institutions, and the presence of an external force that can keep the
peace. Given his broad conception of the opportunity structure, claims
of an unpermissive environment could deflect any evidence that disconfirms a hypothesis. For that matter, viewing institutional flexibility as a
feature of the opportunity structure (91-92) begs the question of where
that structure “ends” and internal control “begins.” The validation and
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invalidation of hypotheses can hinge on whether a factor is deemed to
represent one or the other.
Third, Boyle could have done more to disclose the processes through
which conflicts change. He contends conflicts are complex and fluid but
provides little guidance for predicting if and when one pathway might
give way to the other, strategic violence might give rise to instrumental
violence, or expressive violence might build to the point that it becomes
a strategic force, when channeled effectively by newly emergent group
leaders. Thus, Boyle’s use of the phrase “as predicted” is somewhat misleading when he discusses the fit between the book’s arguments and case
evidence. Boyle presents a variety of scenarios through which a conflict
can unfold but, apart from his general hypotheses, he does not predict
outcomes based on a set of prior conditions. His actual focus is on
the dependent variable – levels and types of violence – which explains
his great attention to gathering, filtering, and categorizing evidence
on violence; lengthy descriptions of trends in violence in the various
countries; generation of a typology for mass, scattered, occasional, and
residual violence; and brief chapter conclusions. Boyle is correct that
“the reasons why experts so often get it wrong when predicting violence
in post-conflict states is that they underestimate the changes in the
incentives and organizational structures of the combatants, which can
alter the character of the violence in subtle and unexpected ways” (305).
He would have well served his reader had he provided clearer guideposts
as to when and where these changes might occur. “Expect the worst” is,
of course, a useful guidepost but it is also reason for inaction, or overreaction, and is of little help for building predictive social scientific theory.
Notwithstanding these deficiencies, Boyle’s book offers valuable insights on an understudied phenomenon of great importance
to academic researchers and policymakers. The conflict in Iraq offers
powerful lessons to policymakers who anticipate a post-conflict phase
that amounts to a “post-hostilities” period, with naive disregard for
the jockeying for position, unresolved tensions, emerging grievances,
and new-found resources that could lead to a continuation of violence.
Boyle’s book is perhaps most useful, then, if read as a sophisticated and
well-argued admonition to policymakers who view military intervention
as a quick fix to a security or humanitarian problem. Policymakers tend
to focus on proximate causes and effects and give far less attention to the
unintended and long-term consequences of policies. Reminders of these
decisional failings are painfully apparent in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan,
and elsewhere around the world where interventions were orchestrated,
some with the best of intentions.

Shaping US Military Forces for the Asia-Pacific: Lessons from
Conflict Management in Past Great Power Eras
By Michael R. Kraig
Reviewed by LT Robert “Jake” Bebber, USN, PhD, Information Warfare officer,
US Cyber Command

H

ow should the United States address a rising China in an era where
“the use of conflict management and strategic reassurance before
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and during crises is likely to be as crucial as war-winning capabilities in a
system where states are, in fact, competitors rather than all-out enemies”? (20)
This becomes the central question in Kraig’s important book, Shaping
US Military Forces for the Asia-Pacific: Lessons from Conflict Management in Past
Great Power Eras. His argument can be summarized as follows:
•• The modern international order has much in common with the era
known as the Concert of Europe (1815 – 1914), “given that today’s
‘complex interdependence’ ties the financial, trade, and manufacturing wealth and individual quality of life within the sovereign states to
the daily functioning of the ‘global common’ as a whole.” (22) This is
worrisome when one considers “territory and values have more often
than not been rightly linked since the rise of nationalism in the last
1700’s.” (75) Nationalism, both between states—and between groups
within states—can create a volatile mix that threatens the rule of
existing elites and can escalate to war.
•• The “American Way of War” must be reconsidered in light of modern,
21st Century Great Power competition. Military doctrine built on
such concepts as “decisive battle,” “full-spectrum dominance,” and
air and naval supremacy are incompatible with an international order
where strategic competition demands pragmatic management of core
national interests between states.
Clausewitz’s principle of strategic defense should underpin a military force structure built on the goal of defensive denial of the adversary
achieving its objectives rather than a vague notion of “victory” and enemy
capitulation. (75, 200)
However, for a book whose title begins with “Shaping US Military
Forces,” one must reach page 300 to find a detailed discussion of the
recommendations on the nature and type of military forces. (Indeed,
this discussion concludes the book and is a mere four pages long.) If the
reader is familiar with many of the on-going debates among naval and
air power theorists, these recommendations are not particularly new,
but they remain no less important to the author’s underlying theory.
Forces will be required to have the ability to “deny permanent military advantages within and even beyond the third island chain without
immediately threatening strategic levels of destruction.” (300-301)
Kraig characterizes this as a “medium-range force” that relies not on a
few, large platforms (such as carriers and attendant support vessels or a
long-range strategic bombing force) but rather a large number of smaller
vessels of “modest but operationally significant stealth and self-defense
characteristics.” He recommends forces be built around two operational
concepts: theater sustainment and escalation control. This would include
“smaller, quicker, much more numerous, and stealthier” versions of
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers which possess “significant antisubmarine
warfare, surface-to-surface, and surface-to-air attack capabilities” while
still retaining the Burke’s missile and ISR capabilities. Long range stealth
bombers like the B-2 should be replaced with “dozens if not hundreds
of highly stealthy, medium-range, medium-carrying-capacity bombers”
which are designed primarily to attack targets at sea rather than penetrate
and attack targets on land. (301, 303) Importantly, this “medium-range
force” will not be designed to denude “China’s credible and capable
nuclear retaliatory forces, nor for decapitating leadership circles.” (304)
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Kraig’s medium-range forces will face a daunting problem of geography and distance. It is nearly 4,000 miles from the American military
bases in both Guam (an American territory) and Yokosuka, Japan (a
key ally) to Hawaii. Small and medium sized surface combatants and
air platforms will be hard pressed to cover such wide expanses without
sufficient logistical support. One need only consider the massive extent
to which the United States had to develop logistical trains to support its
Pacific campaign during World War II. The reader may have appreciated
this topic covered in more detail by Kraig, to include the number and
type of support ships, projected costs and defense of lines of communication. Where would the medium-fighter/bomber forces he proposes
be based, what sort of effective range do they need and what type and
amount of air-refueling and tanker capabilities are needed? What land
power capabilities are necessary to conduct forcible entry (if necessary),
base hardening, ballistic missile defense and air defense? Finally, how can
US military forces be assured of command-and-control in a contested
electro-magnetic environment? These operational questions demand
answers if we are going to reconfigure (or even maintain) military forces
to operate in the Western Pacific.
These operational considerations run head-long into the geopolitical realities of permitting the entire first-island chain to come under
Chinese control. Kraig argues US military forces should not be configured to threaten China’s core national interests and sovereign territory.
Setting aside Taiwan, what are we to do about the fact that China has
declared the entire South China Sea as its sovereign territory? China
is building a navy and air force capable of enforcing these territorial
claims and imposing de facto control over the objections of her neighbors
and maritime disputants like Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia.
What will be the strategic and geopolitical cost to the United States if it
does not possess credible military deterrence capabilities in the first and
second island chains? These should probably be considered.
Kraig’s book is an important contribution to our understanding of
what the future twenty-first century international environment may look
like, and he raises necessary points on the posture of America’s future
military capabilities. While he seems comfortable letting the “professional aviators and naval officers” deal with the detailed operational,
fiscal and acquisition requirements his proposed force structure would
require, further analysis of that effort would also have been helpful.
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Meltdown in Haditha: The Killing of 24 Iraqi Civilians by US
Marines and the Failure of Military Justice
By Kenneth F. Englade
Reviewed by Jeff A. Bovarnick, Colonel, Staff Judge Advocate, United States
Army Special Operations Command
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I

n November 2005, after an improvised explosive device killed one of
their squad members, a number of United States Marines killed 24 civilians in Haditha, Iraq. Compounding the tragedy, the chain of command
failed to report or investigate the deaths properly. Investigations started
months after the incident led to courts-martial charges ranging from
murder to dereliction of duty for the eight Marines involved in the killings and aftermath. In early 2012, after years of legal proceedings, all
the Marine Corps had to show for its immense prosecutorial efforts was
one conviction for one Marine who pled guilty to one specification of
negligent dereliction of duty after initially being charged with 18 specifications of unpremeditated murder. How this “failure of military justice”
occurred is the author’s primary focus in Meltdown in Haditha.
Meltdown is an indictment of the Marine Corps, those involved in the
killings, the cover-up, and lengthy legal proceedings, and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). There was a time after the killings when
the word “Haditha” equated to negative connotations for the Marine
Corps. If that time has passed, Kenneth Englade revives that negative
image with his all-out assault on the Corps. His thesis is clear: the Corps
botched the investigations, mishandled the prosecutions, and engaged
in a systematic suppression and obfuscation of information from the
public. The author also makes the following conclusory statement, and
serious accusation, up front: Meltdown does not determine why the Corps
acted as it did, it tells “how the Corps achieved its apparent purpose of
burying forever (or at least the foreseeable future) particulars that would
have helped fill gaps in the history of this country’s misguided attempts
to bring an American solution to a Middle East problem.” (3)
If the use of numerous legal terms thus far have wearied the reader,
perhaps Meltdown is not for you. Part I covers the background leading up
to the Marines’ deployment to Anbar Province and the reconstruction
of the 19 November 2005 ill-fated convoy, the killings, and the cover-up.
The remainder of the book is devoted to the details of the investigations and numerous legal proceedings for the eight Marines charged
that stretched from February 2006 to April 2012. For readers who enjoy
such details, there are few non-fiction books that match Englade’s skill
at describing the courts-martial process. Remarkably, with no prior
experience covering military justice matters, Englade met the daunting
challenge with minimal errors and omissions. For example, he provides
incorrect maximum punishments for some of the accused Marines (64)
and he appears to consider “customary dead shots” (double-tapping dead
bodies) as acceptable while omitting any discussion of war crimes. (136)
A veteran journalist and an accomplished author, Englade has 14
books to his credit including five historical fiction novels and nine true
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crime books. This first foray into the military justice arena may disappoint his true crime fans as Meltdown is not a legal thriller. Englade’s
experience with civilian cases likely led to his frustration with military
lawyers and spokespersons who are limited in what they can disclose to
the press in on-going cases. When information is divulged, it will not
include insight into a commander’s deliberative process or a lawyer’s
prosecutorial strategy. No one involved in Haditha agreed to an interview with Englade, surely prompting these unabashed comments:
[Marines] may become cliquish, insular, obnoxiously boastful, and openly
mistrustful of anyone who is not or never has been a Marine. As an institution, the Corps is infamous in some circles for its inscrutability, its detestation
of the media, its arrogance, and its refusal to divulge information that it does
not consider in its own best interest. (217)

Englade’s persistence yielded key documents that enabled him to
reconstruct the legal proceedings from the charging decisions and pretrial investigations through the case dismissals and courts-martial. For
fans of detailed legal processes and analysis, including appellate court
opinions on issues such as Unlawful Command Influence, a qualified
reporter’s privilege, and writs of mandamus, Meltdown is replete with
informative explanations.
The author’s treatment of the convening authority for the Haditha
cases, a three-star general at the time, is unrelenting in its criticism and
yet, unwittingly, offers facts to paint a different picture. Consider that
the general read over 9,000 pages of evidence and for four months, he
held one to two strategy sessions per week with each session lasting
from two to five hours. (180-81) Any suggestion that the convening
authority did not exercise due diligence and make informed decisions
is unwarranted. Admittedly unfamiliar with the Corps culture, Englade
still offers this perplexing analogy: “An officer with four stars is like a
prince, maybe the closest thing in contemporary American society to
royalty.” (180) With more insight on the issue, one wonders if Englade
might consider Chief Executive Officer of a Fortune 500 Company to
be a more apt analogy.
While Englade states it as fact, it is for the reader to decide if the
Haditha cases were a “failure of military justice.” Englade serves up this
controversy with one of the most divisive issues in combat – the killing
of civilians alleged to be aiding, mistaken for, or simply near the enemy.
Second-guessing combat troops in the heat of battle shrouded by the fog
of war is an unforgiving task for all involved in the court-martial process.
Yet, it is the courts-martial process and involvement of commanders,
prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges that ensure the procedural and
substantive rights of military personnel are protected and they receive
due process of law. Englade presents a convincing argument that there
were some flaws in the Haditha cases. However, there is an equally effective (and prevailing) counter-argument that the eight charged Marines
benefitted from the due process rights afforded by the UCMJ and the
US Constitution. Englade’s suggestion that the Haditha cases alone will
lead to an examination of the courts-martial process conflates the issues.
More realistic is the acknowledgment that Meltdown is an important book
for those engaged in the military justice debate. Military justice practitioners and those interested in courts-martial books should consider
Judge John Stevens’ Court-Martial at Parris Island: The Ribbon Creek Incident
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(2007) about Drill Sergeant Matthew McKeon’s 1956 trial and Michael
Belknap’s The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the CourtMartial of Lieutenant Calley (2002) about 1LT Lieutenant Calley’s 1970-71
trial. Engalde’s Meltdown in Haditha makes this a worthy triumvirate of
courts-martial literature and enhances the dialogue on the validity of the
UCMJ since its enactment in 1950.

Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheikhs, and the Battle Against
Al-Qaeda
By Bill Ardolino
Fallujah Redux: The Anbar Awakening and the Struggle with
Al-Qaeda
By Daniel R. Green and William F. Mullen, III
Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2013
290 pages
$36.95

Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2014
157 pages
$37.95

Reviewed by Robert L. Bateman, Lieutenant Colonel US Army (Ret.)

S

ome military historians adhere to a fairly rigid set of standards, one
of the key elements of which is the definition of what constitutes
history. Stated in the simplest terms, anything written within 25 years of
an event really cannot be construed as history. It may be a first-person
account, or it may be very good reportage, but it does not rise to the
level of history. The reasons for this are easy to understand; in less than
a quarter-century there is not enough room for consideration. Emotions
are still raw, sources are still sketchy or classified, and there are usually
insufficient resources to analyze an event from more than one perspective. All of which is to say these two books, worthy as each is in its
own way, are not “histories” of the events in and around Fallujah. They
are accounts, one journalistic and one by participants, of those events.
Someday they may well become part of the narrative written by historians, but for now, they are limited by the tyranny of proximity.
Bill Ardolino is what one might consider a “new journalist.” He
has never been employed by a conventional news organization and does
not claim to have any traditional journalistic training, or for that matter
historical education or training. That being said, he is pretty damned
good at what he does and demonstrates the truism that what you need
to do to be a writer is to write a lot. As an “associate editor” for the
online non-profit Long War Journal Adrolino has certainly done that.
More to the point, along the way he has been redefining what it means
to be a journalist, if not a historian. That is an objective observation
with significant implications. Ardolino is dangerously close to being a
cheerleader, which is the opposite of what journalism is supposed to be.
That being said, his account of events in the Fallujah peninsula, the
narrow strip of land within the bend of the river southwest of Fallujah,
is seriously good reading. It is not history, mind you, but in decades to
come Ardolino’s account, meticulously researched and extensively documented will form a part of the core when historians take up this story. It
is not a story about the big picture; it is a micro-story in the finest sense
of the term. Ardolino gets in, deep, and tells a story he also documents;
and no historian can argue with that, despite his likely bias.
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Green and Mullen, on the other hand, are telling the story of what
was happening in “town” at nearly the same time. If Ardolino’s is a
“micro-tactical” story, then Green and Mullen are telling a tactical story
at a slightly, very slightly, higher level. Of course, this being the tale of
marines, there are obligatory swipes at the US Army. But one comes to
expect that from marine stories. Green is a lieutenant commander in the
Navy, Mullen was a battalion commander in Fallujah in ’07. Although
their writing is a tad turgid, their story bears the weight of history quite
well. At the tactical level they come through with the personal story of
the men who really won Fallujah, the Iraqis.
That is a pretty admirable thing which both books share. They give
credit where credit is due, to the Iraqis who fought, and died, and made
things right for a couple of years. Rightly so as well, they give credit to
some truly heroic marines who had the courage to trust, which all of us
who have been downrange and in questionable situations, understand is
a lot scarier than getting shot at. When they shoot at you, the questions
disappear. It is when you do not know – that the heart beats a triple
tango.
Both of these books will be, in the canon, minor points. But as
primary sources, each will endure. Ardolino’s work is better, but narrower. Green and Mullen wrote a broader and fascinating work, which is
not as well sourced, and so should be seen as the account of first-person
participants, with all that implies. In both cases the lesson is loud and
clear: “Listen to the locals.”

Culture in Conflict: Irregular Warfare, Culture Policy, and the
Marine Corps
By Paula Holmes-Eber
Reviewed by Priya Dixit, PhD, Assistant Professor with the Department of
Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

C

hallenges faced by the United States Marine Corps as it confronted
different, and often contradictory, government policies regarding
culture is the central point of this engaging and extensively-researched
book. The author, Paula Holmes-Eber, Professor of Operational Culture
at Marine Corps University, has written an in-depth ethnographic study
of the Marine Corps, one which will be extremely useful to academics,
policymakers and the general public. This book should be mandatory
reading for government officials who are deciding and enacting culturerelated policies.
As Holmes-Eber writes, “the book is about cross-cultural problem
solving-about the messy process of translation, interpretation, and
program implementation as two different worlds struggle to make sense
of one another. The focus is not upon the answer, but the process”
(xvii). This is the central core of the book. She goes on to clarify the
“two different worlds” are not just how the Marines interacted with
locals overseas, but also how they had to deal with new US government
policies regarding culture and language. Thus, Holmes-Eber directs
attention to how there can be, and often are, cultural differences within
the United States military and in its relations with the government.
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“Cross-cultural,” here, does not just mean “how do we (United States)
deal with others overseas?” but also how the Marine Corps culture is
understood and formed, and how Marines understand external government directives and policy changes.
To illustrate the culture of the Marine Corps and its reactions to
new policies, Holmes-Eber divides the book into two parts. The first
outlines the ethos of the Marine Corps. Chapters are titled according to
key Marine phrases and self-understandings. For example, Chapter 2 is
called “Every marine a rifleman” and describes the egalitarian ethos of
the Marine Corps. Similarly, the emphasis on being a leader is in Chapter
5 “Tip of the spear.” After outlining the culture of the Marine Corps
in Part I, the second part of the book focuses on the specifics of how
the Marines incorporated and, sometimes, resisted the “new culture
policy” of the US government (5). Holmes-Eber claims the Marines
“Marinized” the policy through simplification, translation, processing,
and reshaping. Each chapter in Part II explicates one of these methods.
As such, the book is very well-organized for the reader.
This work would not have been possible without Holmes-Eber’s
unique access to her research participants—the Marines. Her wideranging research includes observations at Marine Corps educational
facilities, training sessions, bases and in-depth interviews with over
80 Marines. This is supplemented by an online survey (with 2,406
responses) on “attitudes toward culture and language learning” (23). She
uses the words of the Marines themselves in order to portray their world,
as they see it. The results can be noted in Part I, wherein the challenges
and difficulties but also the sense of accomplishment of those who pass
through Marine Corp training is detailed. The Marines’ self-image is as
ready and adaptable to support the “guy on the ground,” as a “hard, lean
Spartan” (51), with leaders who are capable of quick decision-making in
difficult situations.
Part II, however, is where much of Holmes-Eber’s wideranging
research is utilized. In describing how the Marines have responded to a
post-9/11 environment of a different way of war (long-term insurgencies
in Afghanistan and Iraq) and new policy directives (needing to learn and
understand the culture of where the Marines are fighting), Holmes-Eber
describes how the Marines first simplified the policy directives and then
reshaped them to fit their way of doing things. They did so by learningby-doing, a practice embedded in Marine Corps culture. The discussions
regarding how “throwing away the playbook” (which was often filled
with outdated information, written by people who had little or no experience of the Iraqi and Afghan cultures) as well as how interpreters and
“subject matter experts” were incorporated by the Marines (Chapters
6-8) are some of the best in regard to cross-cultural interactions.
If one were to ask for more information in a book already filled with
wonderful anecdotes and narratives from its research participants, I
would have liked to have seen more of the tensions and challenges—and
the frustrations—the Marines felt at these new government directives.
Holmes-Eber’s Marines are capable and practiced in simplifying and
reworking culture, but surely there must have been resistance internally?
Were there criticisms of government policies or frustrations at what
seems like often contradictory or incomplete guidance provided by the
US government? There is a wonderful statement by an interviewee on
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page 111 which hints at these issues and more perspectives would have
provided a fuller account of Marines’ reactions to policy changes. It
would have been helpful to see more on-the-ground relations between
Marines and foreign civilians. What about Marines who did not fit the
Corps’ self-image of honor, adaptability and warrior-ness? Holmes-Eber
claims the actions of some “young Marines”…“potentially tarnished
the image of the Marine Corps” (130). How did such actions impact
the larger cross-cultural relations between US Marines, civilians, and
officials in Iraq, Afghanistan (and elsewhere)?
Overall, this is an excellent addition to the scholarship on the Marine
Corps and also on organizational learning, ethnography and military
histories. The question whether organizations, in general, reshape external directives to fit their existing culture (as the Marine Corps did here)
is a fascinating one deserving of further research. What about other
branches of the US military? How have foreign militaries responded
to their countries’ new directives on culture and language acquisition?
Holmes-Eber’s book sets the foundation for further research on this
topic.

One Million Steps: A Marine Platoon at War
By Bing West
Reviewed by Benjamin M. Jensen, PhD, Assistant Professor of International
Relations, American University, School of International Service

H

ow do we make sense of war? At what level of analysis do we tell
the story? Is the tale one of larger power competition and bureaucratic intrigue in the formation of campaign strategy, or a story about
individuals and their comrades-in-arms coming to terms with a daily fight
for survival?
Bing West’s One Million Steps uses the experience of a Marine Corps
infantry platoon to conduct what might best be called an ethnography
of war. Through patrolling with one unit and locating its experience
within a larger debate on counterinsurgency campaigns, West writes a
book that operates on three distinct levels.
First, the book captures the tactical dilemmas and stories of individual heroism and tragedy in the struggle to secure Sangin District
in Helmand Province. In early October 2010, Colonel Paul Kennedy
ordered 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment to seize key terrain in
Sangin and attack the enemy. As part of this mission, the battalion conducted distributed operations, establishing multiple, small patrol bases
from which squad-sized formations sought out and engaged Taliban
fighters. The fighting pitted arrays of Taliban improvised explosive
devices and complex ambushes against the Marines’ superior marksmanship and firepower. In the struggle, one unit, 3rd Platoon Kilo Company
suffered the highest casualty rates.
Throughout the experience of 3rd Platoon, West tells the story of
the enduring aspects of warfare at the small-unit level. He shows the
resiliency of tactical formations, how individuals pull together in the
face of extreme adversity. West also highlights the “push-and-pull” of
adaptation. The reader witnesses 3rd Platoon using detached snipers
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and maximizing close air support to destabilize the adversary and deny
terrain. We see the Taliban reaction, engaging Marine patrols with
harassing fire from further afield and changing how they employ IEDs
to attrite foot patrols. In the narrative, adaptation appears as a bottomup quest for survival completely separate from the larger operational and
strategic debates in Kabul.
Second, the book locates 3rd Platoon’s struggle within the larger
strategy in Afghanistan. West moves from the story of individual
Marines to a debate about ends, ways, and means at the heart of the
counterinsurgency campaign. The book characterizes a failure of strategy as misaligned objectives, the divergence between a Marine Corps
focused on a “big stick approach” to counterinsurgency emphasizing
breaking the will of the Taliban and an ISAF leadership advocating
population-centric approaches that limit tactical engagements and focus
on winning the proverbial (and elusive) “hearts and minds.”
In these passages, the book is not partisan or parochial and attacks
multiple administrations and senior military leaders. West characterizes a fundamental failure to review assumptions in the formation of
strategy. He lambasts the approach taken in Afghanistan as a “quixotic
strategy of benevolent war” which devolved into a battle of attrition as
the “absence of strategy.” And the tragedy is not over. West sees future
failures on the horizon, claiming a similar lack of strategic thinking
and appetite for reviewing assumptions persists. He saves his harshest comments for the US Commander-in-Chief, stating, “in place of an
exit strategy, [President] Obama simply exited [Afghanistan] without a
strategy.” Against this backdrop of failed leadership, West contends any
tactical “success was in spite of, rather than because of, the counterinsurgency strategy.”
Third, ghosts haunt the pages. Bing West’s interactions with 3rd
Platoon become a vehicle for remembering his own combat experiences
in Vietnam and role of mythology in helping Marines make sense of
war. These remembrances emerge, often at random, giving the narrative
an almost surreal quality at times. The reader is pulled from a detailed,
empirical account of tactical action to West’s memory of fighting in
Combined Action Platoons, an earlier Marine experiment with distributed operations in a counterinsurgency fight. The reader sees West’s
first encounter with family members who served as Marines in World
War II and the stabilizing role that tales of “Marines past” provide the
generations that follow. While at times disjointed, the net effect of these
remembrances is to provide a portrait of how the individual makes sense
of war. In the end, One Million Steps is as much about Bing West coming
to terms with the tragedy and complexity of war as it is about the later
stages of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan.
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Biography/Memoirs
Fighting the Cold War: A Soldier’s Memoir
By General John R. Galvin USA (ret.) Foreword by General David H.
Petraeus, USA (ret)
Reviewed by Richard Halloran, former military correspondent for The New
York Times, author of To Arm a Nation, and onetime lieutenant of airborne
infantry

T

his engaging memoir of a soldier’s service is an altogether superb
work. The author is candid, lucid, meticulous in research, and writes
with verve on a wide canvas. He is forthright in assessing the political
leaders, diplomats, government officials, scholars, and military officers he
respected and liked—and discreet about those he didn’t. He occasionally
relied on his memory to shape his narrative but mostly drew on, literally,
thousands of 3X5 cards on which he scribbled notes. General Galvin
also appears to have saved every scrap of paper that came into his hands
over four decades, plus copies of those he originated.
This is the chronicle of a Boston Irish-American who served in the
National Guard as a private, graduated from West Point, fought twice
in Vietnam, and helped edit the famous Pentagon Papers. He attended
the usual military schools, taught at West Point, wrote three books, and
commanded a brigade in Europe. The essence of Galvin’s leadership
was perhaps best illuminated by instructions to his battalion commanders. “I want to command in such a way,” he told them, “that you will feel
glad you served under me. You get to command your battalion. I get to
command you, not your battalion.”(241)
As a lieutenant general, Galvin commanded a corps of 83,000 soldiers in Europe before becoming a four star general with command, he
notes wryly, of a joint force of 9,154 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
in the Southern Command.(298) Galvin capped his service as Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe, or SACEUR, the top NATO assignment,
during the last years of the Cold War. General Colin L.Powell, then
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, liked to address General Galvin
as “Charlemagne.” (347) After retiring, Galvin served as Dean of the
Fletcher School at Tufts University in Boston.
Sprinkled throughout this memoir are dozens of examples of military leadership that any officer aspiring to wear stars would benefit from
reading. Moreover, Galvin suggests ways to deal with the cumbersome
Army bureaucracy and how to operate in an often-charged politicalmilitary sphere. He was mentored by General Andrew Goodpaster, then
SACEUR, as the general’s speechwriter. Galvin points to Goodpaster’s
“gentle, roundabout, but very encouraging way of telling you that you
had made a mistake.” (237)
Others who could benefit from this memoir are political leaders
who don’t know which end of the rifle the bullet comes out. The same
is true for many diplomats in the State Department, officials in government departments other than the Pentagon, the press and so-called
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defense intellectuals. Lastly, for the American public that doesn’t know
much about soldiering, dipping into this memoir could be eye opening.
General Galvin’s rise was not straight up. As a major during his first
tour in Vietnam, he got fired as a brigade operations officer in the 1st
Infantry Division when his brigade commander, Colonel Sydney Berry,
told him: “The chemistry is not there. We’re not a good combination.”
(140-141) Galvin was sent to an administrative job in Saigon, a demotion
many officers would consider career-damaging or career-ending. But he
thrashed around and got the chief of staff of the 1st Cavalry Division,
Colonel Herbert E. Wolff, to assign him as an extra hand in operations.
Galvin found that the division commander, Major General John Norton,
“did listen, a characteristic not too often found in commanders.” (153)
In contrast to his first tour, Galvin’s second was remarkable, first as
an intelligence officer and then as a battalion commander. His chapter
about that year is filled with examples of good soldiering. As an intel
operative, Galvin sounds like an experienced war correspondent: “I
became a circuit rider, traveling from one unit to another, thumbing
rides to anyplace where I could pick up news and fit the pieces into a
mosaic.” (180)
Early in his command of 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry in the 1st
Cavalry Division, Galvin ran into a dicey disciplinary problem, eleven
black soldiers accused of insubordination. He met with them alone and
said: “Tell me what happened.” One by one, Galvin writes, the soldiers
spoke “with frankness, clarity, and balance.” They pointed to “missed
communications, unfairness, and frustration” but agreed there “were
better ways to resolve problems than the routes they had taken.” Galvin
told them: “I can get you a chance, a new start, but that’s all. You have
to do the rest.” They all did. (189-190)
After a battle in which several of his soldiers died, Galvin promised
himself: “I would do my best to go to them and look them in the face,
and let that moment register in my mind. Then I would know more
about the cost of the decisions that I made.” (192) Over the next six
months, twenty soldiers in his battalion were killed and fifty-four were
wounded, relatively light casualties.
A surprise running through Galvin’s memoir is his concern with
nuclear weapons, not something expected of infantry commanders.
From the beginning, he was exposed to nuclear issues. As he rose in
rank, that became all the more evident, especially in Europe. An intense
experience as SACEUR was an exercise in 1989 intended, Galvin writes,
“to make sure that all senior political and military leaders of the Alliance
were familiar with what would happen in the event, far-fetched or not,
that nuclear weapons might be employed.” (372) The outcome: “It
opened our eyes, broadened our understanding, took away much of our
posturing, changed our mechanical approaches, and broke through the
group think that bound us.” (379)
When the Berlin Wall came tumbling down, Galvin was anxious to
learn what Soviet units in East Berlin would do. An Air Force officer
suggested asking a Soviet colonel in Berlin what he had heard. The
Russian said: “We have orders to stay in barracks.” (391)
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Even though the end of the Cold War set off a fundamental revision
of NATO, General Galvin’s attention was soon turned to the Persian
Gulf as the US and its allies prepared to drive Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi
dictator, out of Kuwait. Leading US forces would be Central Command,
with European Command in support. Galvin set a tone, telling his staff
that whenever Central Command asked for something, “our answer will
be ‘yes.’ The details can come later, but the answer is always yes.” (405)

The Accidental Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at NATO
By ADM James Stavridis, USN (Ret.)
Reviewed by Nathan K. Finney, US Army Strategist, founder and managing
editor of The Bridge, an online publication focused on policy, strategy, and
military affairs

I

n Accidental Admiral, ADM James Stavridis weaves personal narrative,
recent historical events, and senior-level recommendations into a fairly
compelling story about the first naval officer to simultaneously lead European
Command and the military elements of NATO. One of the most prolific
and recognizable senior leaders in the military, ADM Stavridis turns his
formidable knowledge of recent conflicts into an informative account of
the types of issues the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)
must manage, as well as management principles he used to address them.
Accidental Admiral is written for a general audience, covering basic
issues of military organization and the life of those serve in uniform. For
the reader well-versed in the military, such as those reading Parameters,
these details weigh down the first two chapters, in which Stavridis sets
the stage for his rise to SACEUR and the dynamics he found at NATO.
Of interest, however, was his description of his job as SACEUR, namely,
he was the organization’s operations officer; the basics of the job he
likened to those he learned as the operations officer on a Navy ship many
years before. The process typified NATO’s production of best military
advice Stavridis described – series of meetings of “two hundred-plus
committees that meet in [NATO’s] endless and ultimately self-defeating
search for ‘consensus’” – was fairly reminiscent of any military organization’s operations process.
Once Stavridis turns to the regional issues afflicting his time at
NATO, however, he hits his stride. The core areas run the gamut of those
experienced by many who served in uniform for the last decade-plus,
from Afghanistan to Libya (both out-of-sector missions for EUCOM
and NATO, but because they were NATO-led, the SACEUR was a key
stakeholder in the efforts), Syria and Israel to Russia and the Balkans.
In these chapters, Stavridis’ narrative arc peaks, addressing the most
important issues in Europe and those associated with NATO.
Of most interest to me was Stavridis’ use of Libya and Syria as
discussion points on the value (or dangers, as the case may be) of intervention by foreign military forces in failed countries around the world.
In the case of Libya, in which Stavridis was intimately involved, the
near-term tactical and operational successes led him to provide possible
lessons to be applied elsewhere, with the caveat that all interventions
are “dangerous, politically and militarily risky, and hard to justify under
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international law.” These lessons include a pressing humanitarian need
demands intervention must be considered; interventions should be a
coalition affair; an understanding of the culture and region is crucial
– and more importantly, acting in a way which doesn’t exacerbate said
cultures; casualties must be minimized; it will be expensive; and enablers
like lawyers, strategic communications, and public affairs are crucial
to accurately portray the event. Stavridis summed up the political and
moral ambiguity of interventions with a very pith quote, “in the case
of intervention, as in that of revolution, its essence is illegality and its
justification is its success.” How should this be applied to the current
strategic context? Stavridis leaves that question unanswered.
The latter half of the book is a smattering of personal stories on
leadership (including more famous military scandals during his time
at NATO (namely McChrystal as the “Runaway General,” Petraeus’
personal indiscretions, Allen’s lack of wrongdoing, and even Stavridis’
own travel mistakes), recommended “tricks of the trade” for leaders,
and the importance of innovation and diminishing need for strategic
planning in Stavridis’ career. I was very gratified to see he addressed not
only the leadership issues of those around him – which most well-read
individuals will be already familiar with – but also the items he was
accused of ultimately derailed his chances at being the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Stavridis handles the bureaucratic mess with what
seems equal parts genuine regret at how it happened and acceptance for
the way it turned out.
The two best chapters in Accidental Admiral, and those of most value
to those serving and supporting the military today, are chapters 12
and 15 on strategic planning and “convergence” (or “What Keeps Me
Awake at Night”), respectively. The former is a wonderful discussion
by a well-experienced practitioner, in the staff and command roles, on
the difficulties, and the ineffectiveness, of strategic planning in contemporary times. As you would expect from a walking library, Stavridis
uses myths from Greek literature to describe the difficulties of long
range planning in a dynamic age – including Tantalus, Sisyphus, and
Prometheus – which admirably provide the necessary visual images of
not quite being able to reach the desire goal, consistently pushing the
rock uphill, and being subjected to eternal torment for doing the right
thing. The point of these images in reference to traditional strategic
planning for Stavridis is:
The pursuit of perfection, the potential for sudden catastrophic change, and
the ill effects of forced transparency…made strategic planning in this brave
new world grueling, frustrating, unending, and of less use than it once was.

For Stavridis, strategic planning should be much more like directing
ships at sea (or troops on the battlefield) – there should be strategic guidance detailing the broad goals for five to ten years, then detailed annual
planning based on this guidance. What he doesn’t cover is exactly how
this would be done…or how, other than possibly being less bureaucratic,
this new strategic planning could be implemented. How would this new
approach be governed in a way would transcending the overly bureaucratic system we have today?
Finally, Stavridis addresses the item keeping him awake at night
– convergence. This is the idea where the “sum of the danger…is far
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greater than the individual threat posed by each alone.” According to
Stavridis, the convergence of threats like non-state actors, cyber warfare,
and weapons of mass destruction, while much less likely than each alone,
would be devastating to the United States (and her allies).
Overall, Accidental Admiral is a quick and entertaining read. If readers
of Parameters are unfamiliar with ADM Stavridis’ time as SACEUR, I
recommend this book as a solid starting point for those new to the
conversation about some of our most salient global issues. His chapters
on leadership, strategic communications, and innovation are also useful
words for all military leaders.

Alvin York: A New Biography of the Hero of the Argonne
By Douglas V. Mastriano
Reviewed by Lt Col Mark E. Grotelueschen, USAF, PhD, Associate Professor
of History. Chief, Military History Division, Department of History, USAF
Academy

T

he prolific English writer, journalist, and historian GK Chesterton
once wrote, “Religious liberty might be supposed to mean that
everybody is free to discuss religion. In practice it means that hardly
anybody is allowed to mention it.” Although each person is entitled to
his or her own opinion about this assertion as it applies to general society,
all scholars should be concerned if it suggests historians should shy away
from discussing religion and spirituality when it must be addressed. In this
thorough biography of Alvin York, the American hero of the Great War
and Medal of Honor recipient, Douglas Mastriano avoids that mistake
and allows the role and significance of York’s devout Christianity to take
center stage, which is almost certainly the way York and those who knew
him best would have wanted his story told.
According to Mastriano, York’s faith is the critical thread in his
life’s tapestry, and a knowledge of his religious beliefs and his spiritually motivated actions are as essential to understanding York the soldier
and veteran as they are to understanding York the conscientious objector. Mastriano offers compelling evidence in support of this approach.
The fact that York’s faith and behavior—characterized by hard work,
humility, kindness, generosity, selflessness, and extraordinary moral and
physical courage—often seems too good to be true probably says more
about us and our biases than it does about York.
Mastriano moves through York’s life in a traditional, chronological way, covering his pre-conversion years as a rowdy bar-hopping
troublemaker, his Christian conversion in 1915, which dramatically
changed his behavior, his failed efforts to receive an exemption based
on personal pacifist convictions, and his change of heart on this matter
after his company and battalion commanders convinced him that the
Bible did not prohibit Christians from fighting in a just war (which
they believed the war with Germany was). The story continues with
descriptions of York’s general competence as a soldier in training, both
in the United States and in France, and York’s initiation into combat
in “quiet” sectors of the Western Front. As expected, the book thoroughly describes and examines York’s amazing—he and others would
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say miraculous—actions in the Argonne on 8 October 1918, when he led
a small group of comrades around the flank of a German strongpoint
and knocked it out by capturing 132 enemy soldiers and killing a number
of others. While York’s conversion to Christianity was the fulcrum of
his personal life, this combat success changed his public life beyond all
recognition, making him arguably the most famous common soldier of
the twentieth century.
For Mastriano, York’s superb skill with firearms, his phenomenal
bravery and cool-headedness, and his very survival are all best understood as an outgrowth of his extraordinary religious life and character.
But so too was what happened immediately after: York asked for permission to go back and look for the wounded directly after he turned
over his prisoners. He also made no mention of his accomplishments
to family and friends, refused offers to parlay his new-found fame into
lucrative business deals back in the United States, and ultimately devoted
his own life to improve the lives of his neighbors by working to bring
roads and schools into his impoverished and neglected valley near Pall
Mall, Tennessee. Only when he was convinced the telling of his story
would help his nation understand the threats from Germany and Japan
in 1940—and the proceeds would bring resources to his valley—did
he finally agree to cooperate on a film about his life (Sergeant York, with
Gary Cooper starring as York). It really is a remarkable story of human
development and virtue, and Mastriano tells it well.
In addition to more fully integrating York’s faith into the story of his
life as a soldier and veteran, this exhaustively researched biography gives
readers the most detailed account of what happened in the Argonne in
early October 1918 and exactly where in that hilly, tangled, disorienting forest York and his fellow doughboys accomplished their incredible
martial feat. Mastriano’s extensive use of US Army records, German
sources, archeological fieldwork, and ballistic analyses enabled him
to confirm the exact location of York’s engagement. Additionally, the
research that led to Mastriano’s book also contributed to the creation of
the Sergeant York Historical Trail in the Argonne, which can be walked
today to understand better the location of the event (this reviewer had
the privilege of enjoying the trail in the fall of 2011).
Scholars of the Great War, and especially of the US Army’s experience in it, will benefit from discussions of York’s unit’s training regimen;
the descriptions of small-unit battle in the Meuse-Argonne; and the
clear explanation of the connections between York’s attack and the giant
battle’s other most famous tale—that of the so-called “Lost Battalion.”
It also provides evidence for the German Army’s continued effectiveness as a combat force as late as mid-October; like many other AEF
units in the Meuse-Argonne, York’s regiment suffered severely in attacks
both before and after the 8 October event. This book is invaluable to
both the general reader and the scholar.
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Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army. War Minister Gen.
Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967-1971
Edited by Youssef H. Aboul-Enein
Reviewed by Greg Aftandilian, Center for National Policy, Senior Fellow for the
Middle East

T

he author, US Navy Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, has done
a commendable job translating General Mohamed Fawzi’s memoirs
(published in Arabic in 1984), first for the US Army’s Infantry Magazine
and later for this book. As an American of Egyptian background, he
provides important cultural insights into Fawzi’s thinking and places the
memoirs in the broader context of the 1967 Arab-Israel War and its
aftermath. That war, which was a disaster not only for Egypt but also
for Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians, had profound consequences for
the region. Many social scientists see it as the death knell of pan-Arab
nationalism, contributing to the rise of political Islam. Of equal importance is how the defeat led military leaders like Fawzi (appointed as war
minister by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser) to restructure and
rebuild demoralized Egyptian armed forces and turn them into an effective fighting force that would eventually score some impressive victories
in the initial stages of the 1973 war.
Fawzi, a career military officer and a political ally of Nasser, is very
candid about the problems facing the Egyptian military through the
1967 war. He was, for a time, Army Chief of Staff under Field Marshal
Abdel Hakim Amer, and explains how Amer’s aggrandizement of power
and his neglect of the army’s training hurt the military’s effectiveness.
Fawzi gives a first-hand account of Amer’s instability during the 1967
war when he impulsively ordered a full-scale retreat of Egyptian forces
from the Sinai, without any planning, which led to chaos and the capture
of thousands of Egyptian soldiers by the Israelis.
The memoirs provide a fascinating look into the “War of Attrition”
(1967-1970) and the massive influx of Soviet military hardware and thousands of Soviet military advisors into Egypt. Fawzi explains how this
Soviet assistance, plus extensive training of Egyptian military personnel, were able to challenge Israel’s air supremacy (particularly with the
deployment of SAM sites) and help to build Egyptian military morale.
He also shows how the superpowers used the “War of Attrition” to
test the effectiveness of their weapons systems (the US-supplied Israelis
versus the Soviet-supplied Egyptians). Lacking from Fawzi’s memoirs
is any reflection on how Egypt’s dependence on the Soviets may have
compromised Egypt’s independence. The presence of Soviet advisers
eventually became highly controversial in Egypt, and Sadat ordered
their expulsion in 1972. Fawzi was arrested by Sadat the previous year
for his involvement in the attempted coup led by Ali Sabry. This leaves
the reader to ponder whether Fawzi himself was pro-Soviet despite his
nationalist credentials.
Unfortunately, the book contains only minimal direct excerpts from
Fawzi’s writings. Instead, Aboul-Enein summarizes these writings for
the reader and adds historical and political context to them. For the
non-specialist, this style may be useful (and a direct translation would
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probably be overwhelming), but for the specialist, it leaves the reader
wanting to hear more from Fawzi directly.
There are a few mistakes in the book that should be corrected in
any new edition. For example, on page 11, Aboul-Enein writes Egyptian
military leaders deployed a tank regiment to Iraq in 1961 to aid Iraq’s
efforts against the British in Kuwait, whereas Egypt deployed troops
to Kuwait in 1961 to protect it against Iraq in large part because Nasser
had become a bitter enemy of Iraqi leader Qasim. And on page 147, he
writes that civil-military relations in Egypt in May 2012 “entered a critical phase with more fundamentalist Salafi groups challenging the armed
forces, leading to hundreds of casualties,” whereas that month was the
time of the first-round of the presidential elections and was less violent
than other post-2011 periods.

Ashley’s War: The Untold Story of a Team of Women Soldiers
on the Special Ops Battlefield
By Gayle Tzemach Lemmon
Reviewed by Ellen Haring, Colonel (USA, ret.)

A
New York, NY: Harper
Collins, 2015
320 pages
$26.99

shley’s War is destined to be the first women’s war story in the classic
tradition of action, adventure war stories. 20th Century Fox has
already purchased the film rights and Reese Witherspoon is listed as a
cast member. The story chronicles one of the first groups of servicewomen to volunteer for special operations missions in Afghanistan. Most
Americans, indeed many servicemembers are completely unaware of the
selection program, the training, and the missions these women were
involved in as early as 2010.
The story follows First Lieutenant Ashley White, an unassuming
force of nature whose physical abilities amazed many battle tested soldiers, on her journey to the battlefield of Afghanistan. It reveals the
heart wrenching struggle she has getting her husband to accept her decision and how she hides her work from her twin sister and her parents.
Lemmon gives the reader an insider’s view of the team of “Alpha” women
Ashley joined as it went through the rigorous Cultural Support Team
selection and training program, dubbed 100 hours of hell, and eventually on direct-action night raids with Army Rangers. She examines the
fear common to all soldiers when confronted with combat but more
crucially the added, self-imposed burden these women experienced by
their intense desire to prove women would not just succeed at this work,
but would improve mission success.
As a story about the first women soldiers imbedded in elite ground
combat units the story succeeds brilliantly. However, Lemmon misses
an opportunity to delve into deeper issues surrounding the military’s
involvement in Afghanistan and its own treatment of servicewomen.
What the book fails to do is to examine the role these women played
in the overall conflict or the irony behind the Special Operations community’s need to create this unique program.
After ten years of conflict in Afghanistan, the US military was
casting about for new ways to reach the population in its never ending
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quest to “win hearts and minds.” A number of groups, including Army
civil affairs units as well as development and aide organizations had long
recognized the subtle but important role women play in Afghan society.
And, they knew Afghan women were not predisposed to support the
Taliban. These groups had been engaging with Afghan women for
years. Additionally, many support units, especially military police and
intelligence units had long used their own servicewomen to search
and question Afghan women. But the combat units and leaders who
dominated all of the primary decision-making positions in the theater
had failed to grasp the role women, from both sides, might play in the
conflict.
The only reason the Cultural Support Team, (the incongruent name
given to the initiative) was necessary was because the United States had
no women in the combat arms community, due in large part to its obstinate rejection of servicewomen as equal partners.
But rather than highlight or even acknowledge these shortcomings
in policy, strategy, and operations, Lemmon portrays the special operations community as one of innovative, critical, and creative thinkers
who came up with new approaches to counterinsurgency operations.
Ironically, when they finally realized the potentially important partner
they had missed in Afghan women, they found their own discriminatory
policies limited their tactical options for engaging with them.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, instead of using US servicewomen in any new or truly innovative capacity they simply recruited
female versions of themselves for their teams only to task them to play
a stereotypically feminine support role. They thought having women
on the team would not just allow them to search and question Afghan
women and children but would also ease the impact of invading Afghan
homes and communities.
However, it was unrealistic to think just because servicewoman were
involved in direct-action night raids that residents were going to be any
less traumatized by having their homes and communities raided. For a
young Afghan boy or girl who has his or her home raided in the middle
of the night, and has an uncle or father seized in the dark by Americans,
no amount of young American servicewomen on the raid team would
have made them any less fearful, or angry, or hate-filled.
Despite the book’s shortcomings, it is a timely story since the Army
is considering opening all combat specialties and units to women.
Ashley’s War is the first war story of women heroes from the last decade
of war. Every young woman who has ever aspired to being a war hero
will want to read Ashley’s War.
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Military History
The Longest Afternoon: The 400 Men Who Decided the Battle
of Waterloo
By Brendan Simms
Reviewed by Dr. James D. Scudieri, Research Analyst, US Army Heritage and
Education Center (AHEC), US Army War College
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New York, NY: Basic Books,
2015
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$24.99

his latest work on the Battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1815 concerns
the defense of the farm at La Haye Sainte by the Second Light
Battalion, King’s German Legion (2nd Lt Bn, KGL), under the command
of Maj. George Baring at the time. This unit used the Baker Rifle, already
made famous by the 95th Foot (Rifle Corps) with three battalions in the
battle, but also wielded by the Fifth Battalion, Sixtieth Foot (5/60th),
not at Waterloo. Simms has conducted admirable research to portray as
complete a picture as possible, tapping into British, German, and French
sources. The use of official Hanoverian material is especially refreshing.
Chapter 1 sets the stage for the campaign and the events of the previous two days. There is a detailed explanation of the layout of the famous
farmhouse, which stood forward of the middle of the Allied position,
on the west side of the main road to Waterloo and Brussels. Chapter 2
describes the characteristics of the KGL not simply as a foreign unit in
British service, but as an element of the British Army. Chapter 3 begins
the events of June 18. Simms notes Baring’s commanders, at every level,
did not give La Haye Sainte “any great thought” on that day. The logistical failure of their ammunition resupply is still a topic of debate.
Chapters 4 through 6 supply blow-by-blow accounts of the soon
desperate defense. The extensive research in Hanoverian sources pays
rich dividends here, juxtaposed with British and some French views.
Simms includes adjacent actions, especially noting the contributions
of friendly, supporting units. The battle started on the extreme Allied
right, around 11:30 AM, at the much larger chateau of Hougoumont.
The large French assault by d’Erlon’s I Corps, from about 1:30 PM, on
the Allied left also targeted La Haye. The KGL riflemen repelled several
attacks, but lost some of the farm’s environs. Ultimately, Baring decided
to withdraw his survivors around 6:00 PM as the unit exhausted its
ammunition without any resupply.
Chapter 7 articulates the book’s thesis that the prolonged defense
of La Haye Sainte by 2nd Lt Bn, KGL was the key to the battle. Earlier
French capture would have provided the opportunity to smash a weakened Allied center. Simms further states both Napoleon and the Duke
of Wellington failed to appreciate its importance.
The final chapter covers the aftermath of the unit and men during
the peace, an interesting case study in the post-war fate of veterans.
Their stories of the battle and the emerging historiography were more
complicated for the KGL after they returned to Hanover. The accomplishments of German troops in British service in the midst of a new
German nationalism and unification became complex issues.
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The major issue is the thesis embodied in the subtitle: the 2nd Lt Bn
of the KGL in effect won the Battle of Waterloo due to its prolonged,
stubborn defense. Simms presents a reasonable case, but numerous questions remain. Space precludes a detailed discussion of tactical aspects,
to include the speculation had La Haye Sainte fallen much earlier in the
day. Moreover, rather than propose other possible turning points, this
review emphasizes the specific sequence of certain key events, which in
combination resulted in French defeat.
Perhaps the greatest credit belongs to the Duke of Wellington and
Marshal Blücher. They understood coalition cooperation was critical,
however tentative their commitment to it was. Napoleon had delayed the
start of battle to allow more time for the ground to dry for the benefit of
his artillery fire; in retrospect he used time he did not have.
The late morning, excessive French dissipation against Hougoumont;
the failure of d’Erlon’s initial attack; French Marshal Ney’s premature
cavalry attacks; and the late capture of La Haye Sainte formed an
important sequence. The Prussians had first appeared about 4:00 PM.
They had been fighting at Plancenoit, less than a mile from Napoleon’s
headquarters at La Belle Alliance on the road to Brussels, since 5:00
AM. Furious French counterattacks, ultimately by elements of the Old
Guard, stabilized the situation temporarily—when Ney sought infantry
reinforcements to exploit the capture of La Haye Sainte. The assault
by elements of the vaunted Imperial Guard around 7:00 PM, whose
immediate British opponents was too late—and failed. The Grande
Armée of 1815 could not deal with such a failure. Moreover, by the late
afternoon and evening of June 18 over 72,000 Prussians had marched
to Wellington’s aid.
The Longest Afternoon is a superb case study. Simms’ meticulous
research has enriched the Waterloo literature with this detailed examination of one unit’s determined fight. Whatever the decisiveness of the
actions of the 2nd Light Battalion, at La Haye Sainte, of no doubt is the
saying “Soldiers make a difference.”

Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters,
August 1914-February 1915
By James Goldrick
Reviewed by Larry A. Grant, CDR USN (ret.), Research Associate at The Citadel
Oral History Program and Adjunct Professor, Charleston, SC

B

efore Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August
1914-February 1915 grew out of a project recommended to Goldrick
by naval historian Stephen Roskill. Goldrick first published his work on
the opening months of the First World War North Sea naval confrontation in 1984. Now, a more sophisticated historical understanding of the
pre-1914 period led him to revisit it for this edition. Goldrick also cites
another reason for updating his 1984 book; he says he grew up between
the first edition and this latest. Each of these factors combined to change
his outlook on the subject.
Before Jutland is arranged in seventeen chapters, and roughly the first
third of them present useful background material. “The Beginning”
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provides a summary of the events leading to mobilization. It offers a
snapshot of the condition of the principal northern fleets as they set
aside their peacetime summer pursuits. The Grand Fleet’s movement
to Scapa Flow and the Germans’ retreat from their summer port visits
is traced during the few short weeks in July 1914 as civilian and naval
leadership to came to realize that war was imminent.
Three subsequent chapters introduce the players. Goldrick examines
British staff issues, technological challenges, leadership, wardroom and
lower decks cultures, and the state of the fleet. His review of the German
navy reminds readers that many of the men responsible for its modern
existence and rapid expansion—Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and
Kaiser Wilhelm II—were still in authority. Goldrick reviews the status
of the Admiralstab, the officer corps, and the lower-deck sailors, and
touches briefly on naval legislation and German technology.
The Russian navy rarely features in First World War naval histories,
but given its position in the eastern Baltic Sea, Germany could not afford
to ignore even a weak Russian navy at its back while it dealt with the
British threat in the west. Goldrick reviews the state of Russia’s force in
the Baltic and the country’s rebuilding efforts following the disastrous
Russo-Japanese War. He also notes various obstacles, including a population that produced very few candidates suited to service in a modern
navy.
Following a short summary of the war plans of the three nations,
Goldrick shifts to a more traditional naval-war-at-sea narrative for the
last half of the book, beginning with the August 5th sinking of the
German minelayer, Königin Luise, by HMS Amphion and continuing
through the battle of the Dogger Bank on January 24th, 1915. The
larger engagements are well presented with good maps illustrating the
movements of the ships involved, and Goldrick uses the lessons learned
during those encounters as a basis for his penultimate chapter, “Seeking
New Solutions,” before closing with a brief conclusion.
Before Jutland is both enlightening, particularly in its discussion of
“Operational Challenges,” and entertaining in its narrative of the events
during the various engagements. Anyone interested in naval history will
find Goldrick’s work valuable. They would do well to heed the advice
he gives in the last line of his introduction: “Now read on.” They will
be glad they did so.
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Leadership
Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex
World
By General Stanley McChrystal, with Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell
Reviewed by MAJ Jason Howk, (USA, ret.) author of A Case Study in Security
Sector Reform

T

eam of Teams offers insights into the modern practice of leadership
and management required to navigate and succeed in this complex
world. The book is not a military history, but instead a concise and exceptionally engaging collection of insightful ideas told through entertaining
stories ranging from industry to hospital emergency rooms. I recommend it for leaders and associates from all types of organizations who
need to break down the effects of siloed teams in which information
flow and decision making is ineffective in today’s increasingly complex
environment. If you are working your teams harder and putting more
resources against a problem that isn’t improving, read this book and be
prepared to look closely in the mirror.
The discussions in the book are grounded in organizational management theory and leadership methods. This is not a book about the
latest way to become a great leader. In fact, it is about becoming the
kind of senior leader who can develop and sustain an entire workforce
of great leaders.
I do not come at this review as a scholar of organizational management but rather as a participant and recipient of the Team of Teams
approach in the military where I was a leader for over twenty years.
General Stan McChrystal, along with his three co-authors, believes the
world is now so complex (vice complicated) the old models of command
and control are extinct. I have worked with some ninety American and
international organizations and I cannot think of one that would not
benefit from this study.
An alternate title to this book might have been Trust and Purpose
Meets Empowered Execution. The Task Force’s journey towards shared consciousness and smart autonomy starts in 2003 with the commander’s
stunning realization that it was losing the strategic war against Al Qaeda.
From there, the authors interlace examples and case studies of organizational models, leadership techniques, and technological advances from
a myriad of areas. These include weather forecasting, basketball and
soccer, engineering marvels, big data, airline customer service, aircraft
crews, NASA, SEAL training, plastic surgeons at the Boston Marathon
bombing, GM versus Ford, MIT studies, and the enduring effects of
Ritz Carlton and Nordstrom.
The discussions found in the various chapters of the book are wideranging but relevant to leading all organizations in this modern world.
The following should be of interest to today’s leaders: the difference
between complicated and complex environments; how having more
information available does not improve prediction nor lead to smarter
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decisions at the top; Taylorisms and efficiency ideals may actually cost
more than they save; the “need to know” fallacy; the value of using
your best people as “liaison officers” or “embeds”; how resilient people
make organizations stronger because they can adapt to changing environments; learning from your adversary is time well spent—they might
have a better organizational model not necessarily better people; how
to delegate authority to take action until you are uncomfortable; how to
build trust and a shared awareness of the big picture; “eyes on, hands
off” leadership.
Missing from the book is a deeper discussion on the role of planning,
plans, strategic thinking and strategy. While the Team of Teams approach
allows organizations to be adaptable and resilient there is still a key role
for planning and strategy. Maybe it is as simple as the old adage, “the
plan is nothing but planning is everything.”

